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A PROBABILISTIC WEAK FORMULATION OF MEAN FIELD
GAMES AND APPLICATIONS
RENE´ CARMONA AND DANIEL LACKER
Abstract. Mean field games are studied by means of the weak formulation
of stochastic optimal control. This approach allows the mean field interactions
to enter through both state and control processes and take a form which is
general enough to include rank and nearest-neighbor effects. Moreover, the
data may depend discontinuously on the state variable, and more generally
its entire history. Existence and uniqueness results are proven, along with a
procedure for identifying and constructing distributed strategies which provide
approximate Nash equlibria for finite-player games. Our results are applied to
a new class of multi-agent price impact models and a class of flocking models
for which we prove existence of equilibria.
1. Introduction
The methodology of mean field games initiated by Lasry and Lions [32] has
provided an elegant and tractable way to study approximate Nash equilibria for
large-population stochastic differential games with a so-called mean field interac-
tion. In such games, the players’ private state processes are coupled only through
their empirical distribution. Borrowing intuition from statistical physics, Lasry and
Lions study the system which should arise in the limit as the number of players
tends to infinity. A set of strategies for the finite-player game is then derived from
the solution of this limiting problem. These strategies form an approximate Nash
equilibrium for the n-player game if n is large, in the sense that no player can
improve his expected reward by more than ǫn by unilaterally changing his strategy,
where ǫn → 0 as n→∞ (see [25]). An attractive feature of these strategies is that
they are distributed, in the sense that the strategy of a single player depends only
on his own private state.
Mean field games have seen a wide variety of applications, including models of oil
production, volatility formation, population dynamics, and economic growth (see
[32, 22, 33, 31] for some examples). Independently, Huang, Malhame´, and Caines
developed a similar research program under the name of Nash Certainty Equivalent.
The interested reader is referred to [25] and [26] and the papers cited therein. They
have since generalized the framework, allowing for several different types of players
and one major player.
The finite-player games studied in this paper are summarized as follows. For
i = 1, . . . , n, the dynamics of player i’s private state process are given by a stochastic
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differential equation (SDE):
dX it = b(t,X
i, µn, αit)dt+ σ(t,X
i)dW it , X
i
0 = ξ
i, (1.1)
where µn is the empirical distribution of the states:
µn =
1
n
n∑
j=1
δXj . (1.2)
The drift b may depend on time, player i’s private state (possibly its history), the
distribution of the private states (possibly their histories), and player i’s own choice
of control αit. Here, W
i are independent Wiener processes and ξi are independent
identically distributed random variables independent of the Wiener processes, and
each player has the same drift and volatility coefficients. Moreover, each player i
has the same objective, which is to maximize
E
[∫ T
0
f(t,X i, µn, qnt , α
i
t)dt+ g(X
i, µn)
]
, where qnt =
1
n
n∑
j=1
δαjt
over all admissible choices of αi, subject to the constraint (1.1). Note that the run-
ning reward function f may depend upon the empirical distribution of the controls
at time t, in addition to the same arguments as b. This is part of the thrust of
the paper. Of course, each player’s objective depends on the actions of the other
players, and so we look for Nash equilibria.
Intuitively, if n is large, because of the symmetry of the model, player i’s con-
tribution to µn is negligible, and he may as well treat µn as fixed. This line of
argument leads to the derivation of the mean field game problem, which has the
following structure:
(1) Fix a probability measure µ on path space and a flow ν : t 7→ νt of measures
on the control space;
(2) With µ and ν frozen, solve the standard optimal control problem:{
supα E
[∫ T
0 f(t,X, µ, νt, αt)dt+ g(X,µ)
]
, s.t.
dXt = b(t,X, µ, αt)dt+ σ(t,X)dWt, X0 = ξ;
(1.3)
(3) Find an optimal control α, inject it into the dynamics of (1.3), and find the
law Φx(µ, ν) of the optimally controlled state process, and the flow Φα(µ, ν)
of marginal laws of the optimal control process;
(4) Find a fixed point µ = Φx(µ, ν), ν = Φα(µ, ν).
This is to be interpreted as the optimization problem faced by a single represen-
tative player in a game consisting of infinitely many independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) players. In the first three steps, the representative player deter-
mines his best response to the other players’ states and controls which he treats as
given. The final step is an equilibrium condition; if each player takes this approach,
and there is to be any consistency, then there should be a fixed point. Once exis-
tence and perhaps uniqueness of a fixed point are established, the second problem is
to use this fixed point to construct approximate Nash equilibrium strategies for the
original finite-player game. These strategies will be constructed from the optimal
control for the problem of step (2), corresponding to the choosing (µ, ν) to be the
fixed point in step (1).
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The literature on mean field games comprises two streams of papers: one based
on analytic methods and one on a probabilistic approach.
Lasry and Lions (e.g. [32], [22], etc.) study these problems via a system of partial
differential equations (PDEs). The control problem gives rise to a Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation for the value function, which evolves backward in time. The law
of the state process is described by a Kolmogorov equation, which evolves forward
in time. These equations are coupled through the dependence on the law of the
state process, in light of the consistency requirement (4). This approach applies in
the Markovian case, when the data b, σ, f , and g are smooth or at least continuous
functions of the states and not of their pasts. Results in this direction include two
broad classes of mean field interactions: some have considered local dependence of
the data on the measure argument, such as functions (x, µ) 7→ G(dµ(x)/dx) of the
density, while others have studied nonlocal functionals, which are continuous with
respect to a weak or Wasserstein topology.
More recently, several authors have taken a probabilistic approach to this prob-
lem by using the Pontryagin maximum principle to solve the optimal control prob-
lem. See, for example, [10, 6, 11]. Typically in a stochastic optimal control problem,
the backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) satisfied by the adjoint pro-
cesses are coupled with the forward SDE for the state process through the optimal
control, which is generally a function of both the forward and backward parts.
When the maximum principle is applied to mean field games, the forward and
backward equations are coupled additionally through the law of the forward part.
Carmona and Delarue investigate this new type of forward-backward stochastic dif-
ferential equations (FBSDEs) in [9]. It should be noted that there is a similar but
distinct way to analyze the infinite-player limit of large-population games, leading
to the optimal control of stochastic dynamics of McKean-Vlasov type. Early forms
of a stochastic maximum principle for this new type of control problem were given
in [4, 7, 34]. A general form of this principle was given in [10] where it was ap-
plied to the solution of the control problem. A comparison of these two asymptotic
regimes is given in [12].
The aim of this paper is to present a new probabilistic approach to the analysis
of mean field games with uncontrolled diffusion coefficients. Assuming σ = σ(t, x)
contains neither a mean field term nor a control, we obtain a general existence
result. Under stronger assumptions, we prove a modest extension of the uniqueness
result of Lasry and Lions [32]. Finally, we provide a construction of approximate
Nash equilibria for finite-player games in the spirit of [11], in the case that b has
no mean field term.
Our analysis is based on the weak formulation of stochastic optimal control prob-
lems, sometimes known as the martingale approach; see for example, [15, 30, 37].
This approach depends heavily on the non-degeneracy of σ and its independence
of the control, and in our case, it is also important that σ has no mean field term.
The strong formulation of the problem, as in [11], would require that the state
SDEs have strong solutions when controls are applied. The two formulations are
compared in Remark 7.12. One of the main conveniences of the weak formulation is
that weak existence and uniqueness of the state SDE require much less regularity in
the coefficients, which are allowed to be path-dependent and merely measurable in
the state variable. Also, the value function solves a backward stochastic differential
equation (BSDE), and necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimality of a
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control follow easily from the comparison principle for BSDEs. This method is dis-
cussed by El Karoui and Quenez in [30], Peng in [37], and perhaps most thoroughly
by Hamadene and Lepeltier in [23].
Our results allow for the mean field interaction (at least in the running reward
function f) to occur through the control processes in addition to the state processes.
This seems quite important for many practical applications and has received very
little attention thusfar in the literature of mean field games. A very recent paper of
Gomes and Voskanyan [21] uses PDE methods to study these types of interactions
in the deterministic case, σ ≡ 0, under the name extended mean field games. Under
strong continuity and convexity assumptions, they obtain existence as well as some
regularity of the solutions, and interestingly they are able to allow for general
dependence of the running objective f on the joint law of the state and control
processes. Our setting is very different: notably σ > 0, and our convexity and
continuity assumptions are much weaker.
We also allow for very general nonlocal mean field interactions, including but
not limited to weakly or Wasserstein continuous functionals. Among the natural
interactions that have not yet been addressed in the mean field games literature
which we are able to treat, we mention the case of coefficients which depend on the
rank (Example 5.9 in Section 5), or on the mean field of the individual’s nearest
neighbors (Section 2.2). Our framework also includes models with different types
of agents, similar to [25]. Moreover, f does not need to be strictly convex, and
may in fact be identically zero. A final novelty of our results worth emphasizing is
that they apply in non-Markovian settings and require no continuity in the state
variable.
For the sake of illustration, we present two applications which had been touted as
models for mean field games, without being solved in full generality. First we study
price impact models in which asset price dynamics depend naturally on the rates of
change of investors’ positions, inspired by the model of Carlin et al. [8]. As a second
application of our theoretical results, we discuss a model of flocking proposed by
Nourian et al. in [35] to provide a mechanism by which flocking behavior emerges as
an equilibrium, as a game counterpart of the well-known Cucker-Smale model, [14].
In [35], the authors identify the mean field limit and, under the assumption that
there exists a unique solution to the limiting mean field game, construct approxi-
mate Nash equilibria for the finite-player games. While flocking is often defined
mathematically as a large time phenomenon (case in point, the stationary form of
the mean field game strategy is considered in [35]), we treat the finite horizon case
to be consistent with the set-up of the paper, even though this case is most often
technically more challenging. We provide existence and approximation results for
both their model and two related nearest-neighbor models.
This paper is organized as follows. We introduce the two practical applications in
Section 2. The price impact models of Section 2.1 motivate the analysis of mean field
games in which players interact through their controls, while Section 2.2 describes
the flocking model of [35] as well as two related nearest-neighbor models. Then,
Section 3 provides precise statements of the assumptions used throughout the paper
and the main existence and uniqueness results. Section 4 explains the construction
of approximate Nash equilibria for the finite-player game. The assumptions of the
main theorems are discussed in more detail in Section 5, along with important
examples. In Section 6 the general theory is specialized to the applications of
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Section 2. The proofs of the main theorems of Sections 3 and 4 are given in Sections
7 and 8, respectively.
2. Applications
2.1. Price impact models. To motivate our generalization of the class of mean
field games worthy of investigation, we present a simple multi-agent model of price
impact which leads to mean field interaction through the control processes. The
model is along the lines of Almgren and Chriss’s model [3] for price impact, or rather
its natural extension to an n-player competitive game given by Carlin, Lobo, and
Viswanathan in [8]. The latter model is highly tractable, modeling a flat order book
from which each agent must execute a fixed order. We instead model a nonlinear
order book and use fairly general reward functions. See [1, 20] for a discussion
of order book mechanics as well as a discussion of resilience, a concept we do not
address. In our model, after each trade, the order book reconstructs itself instantly
around a new mid-price St, and with the same shape. At each time t, each agent
faces a cost structure given by the same transaction cost curve c : R→ [0,∞], which
is convex and satisfies c(0) = 0. We consider only order books with finite volume;
an infinite value for c(α) simply means that the volume α is not available. Flat
order books are common in the literature, though not realistic: they correspond to
quadratic transaction costs c.
We work on a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P ) supporting
n + 1 independent Wiener processes, W 1, . . . ,Wn and B. Let S denote the asset
price, Ki the cash of agent i, and X i his position. Each agent controls his trading
rate αit and his position evolves according to
dX it = α
i
tdt+ σdW
i
t .
The noise term σdW it models a random stream of demand that a broker may receive
from his clients. If a single agent i places a market order of αit when the mid-price
is St, the transaction costs him α
i
tSt + c(α
i
t). Hence, the changes in cash of agent
i are naturally given by
dKit = −(αitSt + c(αit))dt.
Assuming c is differentiable on its domain, the marginal price per share of this trade
is St + c
′(αit), meaning that the agent receives all of the volume on the order book
between the prices St and St + c
′(αit). The order book should recenter somewhere
in this price range, say at St + γc
′(αit)/n, where γ > 0. The factor of 1/n is
irrelevant when n is fixed, but it is the right scaling factor for obtaining a mean
field approximation.
In a continuous-time, continuous-trading model with multiple agents, it is not
clear how simultaneous trades should be handled. Somewhat more realistic are
continuous-time, discrete-trade models, which many continuous-trade models are
designed to approximate. In a continuous-time, discrete-trade model, it is reason-
able to assume that agents never trade simultaneously, given that there is a contin-
uum of trade times to choose from. We choose to model this in our continuous-trade
setting in the following manner: When the n agents trade at rates α1t , . . . , α
n
t at
time t, agent i still pays αitSt + c(α
i
t), but the total change in price is
γ
n
n∑
i=1
c′(αit).
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Finally, the mid-price is modeled as an underlying martingale plus a drift repre-
senting a form of permanent price impact:
dSt =
γ
n
n∑
i=1
c′(αit)dt+ σ0dBt.
Note that the particular case c(α) = α2 corresponds to the influential Almgren-
Chriss model [3]. The wealth V it of agent i at time t, as pegged to the mid-price,
is given by V i0 +X
i
tSt +K
i
t , which leads to the following dynamics:
dV it =
γ
n
n∑
j=1
c′(αjt )X
i
t − c(αit)
 dt+ σ0X itdBt + σStdW it . (2.1)
We assume that the agents are risk-neutral and seek to maximize their expected
terminal wealths at the end of the trading period, including some agency costs given
by functions f and g, so that the objective of agent i is to maximize:
J i = E
[
V iT −
∫ T
0
f(t,X it)dt− g(X iT )
]
.
Price impact models are most often used in optimal execution problems for high
frequency trading. Because of their short time scale, the fact that St as defined
above can become negative is not an issue in practice. In these problems, one often
chooses g(x) = mx2 for some m > 0 in order to penalize left over inventory. The
function f is usually designed to provide an incentive for tracking a benchmark, say
the frequently used market volume weighted average price (VWAP) and a penalty
slippage.
If the control processes are square integrable and the cost function c has at most
quadratic growth, the volumes X it and the transaction price St are also square
integrable and the quadratic variation terms in (2.1) are true martingales. So after
using Itoˆ’s formula we find
J i = E
∫ T
0
γ
n
n∑
j=1
c′(αjt )X
i
t − c(αit)− f(t,X it)
 dt− g(X iT )
 .
Treating X i as the state processes, this problem is of the form described in the
introduction. The general theory presented in the sequel will apply to this model
under modest assumptions on the functions c, f , and g, ensuring existence of ap-
proximate Nash equilibria. Intuitively, when n is large, a single agent may ignore
his price impact without losing much in the way of optimality. This model could be
made more realistic in many ways, but we believe any improvement will preserve
the basic structure of the price impact, which naturally depends on the mean field
of the control processes. It should be mentioned that the risk-neutrality assump-
tion is crucial and hides a much more difficult problem. Without risk-neutrality,
we would have to keep track of V and S as state processes. More importantly, the
Brownian motion B would not disappear after taking expectations, and this would
substantially complicate the mean field limit.
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2.2. Flocking models. The position X it and velocity V
i
t of individual i change
according to
dX it = V
i
t dt,
dV it = α
i
tdt+ σdW
i
t ,
where αit is the individual’s acceleration vector, W
i are independent d-dimensional
Wiener processes, and σ > 0 is a d × d matrix (usually d = 2 or d = 3). The
objective of individual i is to choose αi to minimize
E
∫ T
0
|αit|2R +
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
j=1
(V jt − V it )φ(|Xjt −X it |)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
Q
dt
 . (2.2)
Here, φ : [0,∞) → [0,∞) is a nonincreasing function, and |x|Q := x⊤Qx and
|x|R := x⊤Rx for x ∈ Rd, where Q and R are positive semidefinite d× d matrices.
The |αit|2R term penalizes too rapid an acceleration, while the second term provides
an incentive for an individual to align his velocity vector with the average velocity of
the flock. The weights φ(|Xjt −X it |) emphasize the velocities of nearby (in position)
individuals more than distant ones. In [35], drawing inspiration from [14], φ is of
the form
φ(x) = c
(
1 + x2
)−β
, β ≥ 0, c > 0. (2.3)
Our existence and approximation results apply to the model above as well as
a related model in which the weights in (2.2) take a different form. Namely, in-
dividual i may give non-zero weight only to those individuals it considers to be
neighbors, where the set of neighbors may be determined in two different ways.
Nearest neighbor rules pre-specify a radius r > 0, and an individual i’s neighbors
at time t are those individuals j with |Xjt −X it | ≤ r. Letting N it denote the set of
such j and |N it | its cardinality, the objective function is
E
∫ T
0
|αit|2R +
∣∣∣∣∣∣ c|N it |
∑
j∈Nit
(V jt − V it )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
Q
dt
 . (2.4)
This is inspired by what is now known as Vicsek’s model, proposed in [40] and
studied mathematically in [29]. On the other hand, recent studies such as [5]
provide evidence that birds in flocks follow so-called k-nearest neighbor rules, which
track only a fixed number k ≤ n of neighbors at each time. The corresponding
objective function is the same, if we instead define N it to be the set of indices j of
the k closest individuals to i (so of course |N it | = k). Note that there are no “ties”;
that is, for each distinct i, j, l ≤ n and t > 0, we have P (|X it−Xjt | = |X it−X lt |) = 0.
3. Mean field games
We turn now to a general discussion of the mean field game models which we
consider in this paper. We collect the necessary notation and assumptions in order
to state the main existence, uniqueness, and approximation theorems.
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3.1. Construction of the mean field game. Let B(E, τ) denote the Borel σ-
field of a topological space (E, τ). When the choice of topology is clear, we use
the abbreviated form B(E). For a measurable space (Ω,F), let P(Ω) denote the
set of probability measures on (Ω,F). We write µ ≪ µ′ when µ is absolutely
continuous with respect to µ′, and µ ∼ µ′ when the measures are equivalent. Given
a measurable function ψ : Ω→ [1,∞), we set:
Pψ(Ω) =
{
µ ∈ P(Ω) :
∫
ψ dµ <∞
}
,
Bψ(Ω) =
{
f : Ω→ R measurable, sup
ω
|f(ω)|/ψ(ω) <∞
}
.
We define τψ(Ω) to be the weakest topology on Pψ(Ω) making the map µ 7→
∫
f dµ
continuous for each f ∈ Bψ(Ω). The space (Pψ(Ω), τψ(Ω)) is generally neither
metrizable nor separable, which will pose some problems. We define the empirical
measure map en : Ω
n → P(Ω) by
en(ω1, . . . , ωn) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
δωj .
Notice that en need not be B(Pψ(Ω), τψ(Ω))-measurable, but this will not be an
issue.
Definition 3.1. Given measurable spaces E and F , we say that a function f :
P(Ω)× E → F is empirically measurable if
Ωn × E ∋ (x, y) 7→ f(en(x), y) ∈ F
is jointly measurable for all n ≥ 1.
Let C := C([0, T ];Rd) be the space of Rd-valued continuous functions on [0, T ]
endowed with the sup-norm ‖x‖ := sups∈[0,T ] |x(s)| and fix a Borel measurable func-
tion ψ : C → [1,∞) throughout. It will play a role similar to the “Lyapunov-like”
function of Ga¨rtner [19], controlling a tradeoff between integrability and continu-
ity requirements. Some comments on the choice of ψ follow in Remark 3.7. For
any µ ∈ P(C) and t ∈ [0, T ], the marginal µt denotes the image of µ under the
coordinate map C ∋ x 7→ xt ∈ Rd.
We use the notation λ0 ∈ P(Rd) for the initial distribution of the infinitely many
players’ state processes. Let Ω := Rd×C, define ξ(x, ω) := x andW (x, ω) := ω, and
let P denote the product of λ0 and the Wiener measure, defined on B(Ω). Define
Ft to be the completion of σ((ξ,Ws) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t) by P -null sets of B(Ω), and set
F := (Ft)0≤t≤T . We work with the filtered probability space (Ω,FT ,F, P ) for the
remainder of the section. For k ∈ N and q ≥ 1 define the space Hq,k to be the set
of progressively measurable h : [0, T ]× Ω→ Rk satisfying
E
(∫ T
0
|ht|2dt
)q/2 <∞.
For a martingale M , we denote by E(M) its Doleans stochastic exponential. We
now state assumptions on the data which will stand throughout the paper. Unless
otherwise stated, Pψ(C) is equipped with the topology τψ(C).
The following assumptions (S) are implicitly assumed throughout the paper.
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Assumption (S) (Standing assumptions).
(S.1) The control space A is a compact convex subset of a normed vector space,
and the set A of admissible controls consists of all progressively measurable
A-valued processes. The volatility σ : [0, T ] × C → Rd×d is progressively
measurable. The drift b : [0, T ]× C × Pψ(C) × A → Rd is such that (t, x) 7→
b(t, x, µ, a) is progressively measurable for each (µ, a), and a 7→ b(t, x, µ, a) is
continuous for each (t, x, µ).
(S.2) There exists a unique strong solution X of the driftless state equation
dXt = σ(t,X)dWt, X0 = ξ, (3.1)
such that E[ψ2(X)] < ∞, σ(t,X) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] almost surely, and
σ−1(t,X)b(t,X, µ, a) is uniformly bounded.
We will elaborate on these and the subsequent assumptions in Section 6 below,
but for now let us make a few remarks. If σ has linear growth, ψ(x) = 1+‖x‖p, and∫
Rd
|x|2pλ0(dx) < ∞, then indeed E[ψ2(X)] < ∞. Compactness of A is a strong
assumption which will be used in several places, in particular to ensure that P(A)
is compact. Boundedness of σ−1b is also restrictive, but it will be crucial to ensure
that the Hamiltonian is a uniformly Lipschitz function of the adjoint variable. See
Remark 5.8 for more details and some comments about relaxing these assumption.
From now on, X denotes the unique solution of (3.1). For each µ ∈ Pψ(C) and
α ∈ A, define a measure Pµ,α on (Ω,FT ) by
dPµ,α
dP
= E
(∫ ·
0
σ−1b (t,X, µ, αt) dWt
)
T
.
By Girsanov’s theorem and boundedness of σ−1b, the process Wµ,α defined by
Wµ,αt := Wt −
∫ t
0
σ−1b (s,X, µ, αs) ds
is a Wiener process under Pµ,α, and
dXt = b (t,X, µ, αt) dt+ σ(t,X)dW
µ,α
t .
That is, under Pµ,α, X is a weak solution of the state equation. Note that Pµ,α
and P agree on F0; in particular, the law of X0 = ξ is still λ0. Moreover, ξ and W
remain independent under Pµ,α.
Remark 3.2. It is well-known that the nonsingularity assumption (S.2) of σ guar-
antees that F coincides with the completion of the filtration generated by X . It is
thus implicit in the definition of A that our admissible controls can be written in
closed-loop form, that is as deterministic functions of (t,X).
We now state the assumptions on the reward functions entering the objectives
to be maximized by the players. Throughout, P(A) is endowed with the weak
topology and its corresponding Borel σ-field.
(S.3) The running reward f : [0, T ]× C × Pψ(C) × P(A) × A → R is such that
(t, x) 7→ f(t, x, µ, q, a) is progressively measurable for each (µ, q, a) and
a 7→ f(t, x, µ, q, a) is continuous for each (t, x, µ, q). The terminal reward
function g : C × Pψ(C) → R is such that x 7→ g(x, µ) is Borel measurable
for each µ.
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(S.4) There exist c > 0 and an increasing function ρ : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) such that
|g(x, µ)|+ |f(t, x, µ, q, a)| ≤ c
(
ψ(x) + ρ
(∫
ψ dµ
))
, ∀(t, x, µ, q, a).
Since ψ ≥ 1, this is equivalent to the same assumption but with ψ replaced
by 1 + ψ.
(S.5) The function f is of the form
f(t, x, µ, q, a) = f1(t, x, µ, a) + f2(t, x, µ, q).
Remark 3.3. The only restrictive assumption among (S.3-5) is (S.5). Combined
with the assumption that b does not depend on q, assumption (S.5) renders the
maximizer(s) of the Hamiltonian independent of the P(A) argument. Separation
assumptions of this sort are common in mean field games literature, largely for this
reason (c.f. [32]).
Given a measure µ ∈ Pψ(C), a control α ∈ A, and a measurable map [0, T ] ∋
t 7→ qt ∈ P(A), we define the associated expected reward by
Jµ,q(α) := Eµ,α
[∫ T
0
f(t,X, µ, qt, αt)dt+ g(X,µ)
]
where Eµ,α denotes expectation with respect to the measure Pµ,α. Considering µ
and q as fixed, we are faced with a standard stochastic optimal control problem,
the value of which is given by
V µ,q = sup
α∈A
Jµ,q(α).
Definition 3.4. We say a measure µ ∈ Pψ(C) and a measurable function q :
[0, T ]→ P(A) form a solution of the MFG if there exists α ∈ A such that V µ,q =
Jµ,q(α), Pµ,α ◦X−1 = µ, and Pµ,α ◦ α−1t = qt for almost every t.
3.2. Existence and uniqueness. Some additional assumptions are needed for the
existence and uniqueness results. Define the Hamiltonian h : [0, T ]× C × Pψ(C) ×
P(A)×Rd×A→ R, the maximized HamiltonianH : [0, T ]×C×Pψ(C)×P(A)×Rd →
R, and the set on which the supremum is attained by
h(t, x, µ, q, z, a) := f(t, x, µ, q, a) + z · σ−1b(t, x, µ, a),
H(t, x, µ, q, z) := sup
a∈A
h(t, x, µ, q, z, a), (3.2)
A(t, x, µ, q, z) := {a ∈ A : h(t, x, µ, q, z, a) = H(t, x, µ, q, z)},
respectively. Note that A(t, x, µ, q, z) does not depend on q, in light of assumption
(S.5), so we shall often drop q from the list of arguments of A and use the notation
A(t, x, µ, z). Note also that A(t, x, µ, z) is always nonempty, since A is compact and
h is continuous in a by assumptions (S.1) and (S.3).
Assumption (C). For each (t, x, µ, z), the set A(t, x, µ, z) is convex.
It will be useful to have notation for the driftless law and the set of equivalent
laws:
X := P ◦X−1 ∈ Pψ(C)
PX := {µ ∈ Pψ(C) : µ ∼ X} .
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Assumption (E) (Existence assumptions). For each (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×C the following
maps are sequentially continuous, using τψ(C) on PX and the weak topology on
P(A):
PX ×A ∋ (µ, a) 7→ b(t, x, µ, a),
PX × P(A)×A ∋ (µ, q, a) 7→ f(t, x, µ, q, a),
PX ∋ µ 7→ g(x, µ).
Theorem 3.5. Suppose (E) and (C) hold. Then there exists a solution of the
MFG.
Remark 3.6. It is worth emphasizing that sequential continuity is often easier to
check for τψ(C), owing in part to the failure of the dominated convergence theorem
for nets. For example, functions like
µ 7→
∫ ∫
φ(x, y)µ(dx)µ(dy)
for bounded measurable φ are always sequentially continuous but may fail to be
continuous.
Remark 3.7. The function ψ enters the assumptions in two essential ways. On
the one hand, the functions b, f , and g should be τψ(C)-continuous in their measure
arguments as in (E). On the other hand, the solution of the SDE dXt = σ(t,X)dWt
should possess ψ2-moments as in (S.2), and the growth of f and g should be con-
trolled by ψ, as in (S.4). There is a tradeoff in the choice of ψ: larger ψ makes the
latter point more constraining and the former less constraining.
The following uniqueness theorem is inspired by Lasry and Lions [32]. They
provide counterexamples to show that one should not expect uniqueness in much
generality, unless one assumes that the time horizon is small and the coefficients
are suitably Lipschitz (e.g. [25]).
Assumption (U).
(U.1) For each (t, x, µ, z), the set A(t, x, µ, z) is a singleton;
(U.2) b = b(t, x, a) has no mean field term;
(U.3) f(t, x, µ, a) = f1(t, x, µ) + f2(t, µ, q) + f3(t, x, a) for some f1, f2, and f3;
(U.4) For all µ, µ′ ∈ Pψ(C),∫
C
[
g(x, µ)− g(x, µ′) +
∫ T
0
(f1(t, x, µ) − f1(t, x, µ′)) dt
]
(µ− µ′)(dx) ≤ 0.
Theorem 3.8. Suppose (U) holds. Then there is at most one solution of the MFG.
Corollary 3.9. Suppose (E) and (U) hold. Then there exists a unique solution of
the MFG.
Remark 3.10. The following simple extension of the above formulation allows
more heterogeneity among agents. Work instead on a probability space Ω = Ω′ ×
Rd × C, where Ω′ is some measurable space which will model additional time-zero
randomness. We may then fix an initial law λ0 ∈ P(Ω′ × Rd), and let P be the
product of λ0 and Wiener measure. Letting (θ, ξ,W ) denote the coordinate maps,
we work with the filtration generated by the process (θ, ξ,Ws)0≤s≤T . The data
b, σ, f , and g may all depend on θ. In the finite-player game, the agents have
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i.i.d. initial data (θi, ξi), known at time zero, where ξi is the initial state and θi
can encode other differences between the agents. For example, in a price impact
model, perhaps a fraction ρ ∈ [0, 1] of the agents need to liquidate but the rest
do not; this can be modeled using such a θ which equals c > 0 with probability ρ
and 0 otherwise, and setting g(X, θ) = θ|XT |2 for some c > 0. This generalization
complicates the notation but changes essentially none of the analysis.
4. Approximate Nash equilibria for finite-player games
Before proving these theorems, we discuss how a solution of the MFG may be
used to construct an approximate Nash equilibrium for the finite-player game, using
only distributed controls. Additional assumptions are needed for the approximation
results:
Assumption (F).
(F.1) b = b(t, x, a) has no mean field term;
(F.2) For all (t, x, µ, q, a), f(t, x, µ, q, a) = f(t, x, µt, q, a), where µt denotes the
image of µ under the map C ∋ x 7→ x·∧t ∈ C;
(F.3) The functions b, f , and g are empirically measurable, as in Definition 3.1,
using the progressive σ-field on [0, T ]× C, and Borel σ-fields elsewhere;
(F.4) For each (t, x), the following functions are continuous at each point satisfying
µ ∼ X :
Pψ(C)× P(A)×A ∋ (µ, q, a) 7→ f(t, x, µ, q, a),
Pψ(C) ∋ µ 7→ g(x, µ);
(F.5) There exists c > 0 such that, for all (t, x, µ, q, a),
|g(x, µ)|+ |f(t, x, µ, q, a)| ≤ c
(
ψ(x) +
∫
ψ dµ
)
.
Remark 4.1. The continuity assumption (F.4) is stronger than assumption (E).
Indeed, in (E) we required only sequential continuity on a subset of the space Pψ(C).
Assumption (F.2) is simply progressive measurability of f with respect to the mea-
sure argument, which in fact was not needed for the results of Section 3. Analogs
of the result of this section are possible when (F.1) fails, under stronger continu-
ity requirements. Namely, σ−1b, f , and g should be continuous in µ uniformly in
the other arguments, and σ−1b should be uniformly Lipschitz in µ with respect to
total variation. However, we refrain from elaborating on this result, as it seems
suboptimal and the proof is quite long.
Adhering to the philosophy of the weak formulation, we choose a single con-
venient probability space on which we define the n-player games, simultaneously
for all n. Assumptions (C) and (F) stand throughout this section (as does (S), as
always). We fix a solution of the MFG (µˆ, qˆ) throughout, whose existence is guar-
anteed by Theorem 3.5, with corresponding closed-loop control αˆ(t, x) (see Remark
3.2). Consider a probability space (Ω,F , P ) supporting a sequence (W 1,W 2, . . .)
of independent d-dimensional Wiener processes, independent Rd-valued random
variables (ξ1, ξ2, . . .) with common law λ0, and processes (X
1, X2, . . .) satisfying
dX it = b(t,X
i, αˆ(t,X i))dt+ σ(t,X i)dW it , X
i
0 = ξ
i.
For each n, let Fn = (Fnt )t∈[0,T ] denote the completion of the filtration generated
by (X1, . . . , Xn) by null sets of F . Let Xi denote the completion of the filtration
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generated by X i. Note that X i are independent and identically distributed and
that the process (ξi,W it )0≤t≤T generates the same filtration X
i, as in Remark 3.2.
Abbreviate αit = αˆ(t,X
i). These controls are known as distributed controls.
We now describe the n-player game for fixed n. The control space An is the set
of all Fn-progressively measurable A-valued processes; the players have complete
information of the other players’ state processes. On the other hand, Ann is the n-
fold Cartesian product of An, or the set of F
n-progressively measurable An-valued
processes. Let µn denote the empirical measure of the first n state processes as
defined in the introduction by (1.2). For β = (β1, . . . , βn) ∈ Ann, define a measure
Pn(β) on (Ω,FnT ) by the density
dPn(β)
dP
:= E
(∫ ·
0
n∑
i=1
(
σ−1b(t,X i, βit)− σ−1b(t,X i, αit)
)
dW it
)
T
.
Under Pn(β), for each i = 1, . . . , n, X
i is a weak solution of the SDE
dX it = b(t,X
i, βit)dt+ σ(t,X
i)dW β
i,i
t ,
where
W β
i,i
· := W· −
∫ ·
0
[
σ−1b(t,X i, βit)− σ−1b(t,X i, αit)
]
dt
is a d-dimensional Pn(β)-Wiener process. Note that X
i
0 are i.i.d. with common law
λ0 under any of the measures Pn(β) with β ∈ Ann. For β = (β1, . . . , βn) ∈ Ann, the
value to player i of the strategies β is defined by
Jn,i(β) := E
Pn(β)
[∫ T
0
f(t,X i, µn, qn(βt), β
i
t)dt+ g(X
i, µn)
]
,
where, for a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ An, we define
qn(a) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
δai .
Note that the joint measurability assumption (F.3) guarantees that g(X i, µn) is FnT -
measurable, while (F.2) and (F.3) ensure that f(t,X i, µn, qn(βt), β
i
t) and b(t,X
i, βit)
are progressively measurable with respect to Fn.
Theorem 4.2. Assume (C) and (F) hold, and let (µˆ, qˆ) denote a solution of the
MFG, with corresponding closed-loop control αˆ = αˆ(t, x) (see Remark 3.2). Then
the strategies αit := αˆ(t,X
i) form an approximate Nash equilbrium for the finite-
player game in the sense that there exists a sequence ǫn ≥ 0 with ǫn → 0 such that,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and β ∈ An,
Jn,i(α
1, . . . , αi−1, β, αi+1, . . . , αn) ≤ Jn,i(α1, . . . , αn) + ǫn.
Remark 4.3. The punchline is that αi is Xi-adapted for each i. That is, player i
determines his strategy based only on his own state process. As explained earlier,
such strategies are said to be distributed. The theorem tells us that even with full
information, there is an approximate Nash equilibrium consisting of distributed
controls, and we know precisely how to construct one using a solution of the MFG.
Note that the strategies (αi)i∈N also form an approximate Nash equilibrium for any
partial-information version of the game, as long as player i has access to (at least)
the filtration Xi generated by his own state process.
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5. Discussion of the assumptions and examples
This section discusses some important special cases of the assumptions of Sec-
tions 3 and 4. Assumptions (C) and (U) are examined first, before we turn to
assumptions (S), (E), and (F).
5.1. Assumptions (C) and (U). Condition (C) (resp. (U.1)) is crucial for
the fixed point (resp. uniqueness) argument and holds when the Hamiltonian
h(t, x, µ, q, z, a) is concave (resp. strictly concave) in a, for each (t, x, µ, q, z), which
is a common assumption in control theory. For example, condition (C) (resp. (U.1))
holds if b is affine in a and f is concave (resp. strictly concave) in a. More gener-
ally, we can get away with quasiconcavity in the previous statements. Note that if
f ≡ 0 then A(t, x, µ, 0) = A, and thus condition (U.1) fails except in trivial cases.
However, condition (C) frequently holds even in the absence of a running reward
function f ≡ 0; the optimal control in such a case is typically a bang-bang control.
Example 5.1 (Monotone functionals of measures). Here we provide some examples
of the monotonicity assumption (U.4) of Theorem 3.8. For any of the following g,
we have ∫
C
[g(x, µ)− g(x, µ′)] (µ− µ′)(dx) ≤ 0, ∀µ, µ′ ∈ Pψ(C).
• g(x, µ) = φ1(x) + φ2(µ) for some φ1 : C → R and φ2 : Pψ(C) → R. In this
case, there is equality for all µ, µ′.
• g(x, µ) = ∣∣φ(x)− ∫
C
φ(y)µ(dy)
∣∣2 for some φ : C → R. If, for example,
φ(x) = x, then this payoff function rewards a player if his state process
deviates from the average.
• g(x, µ) = − ∫
Rd
φ(|x − y|)µT (dy), where φ : [0,∞) → [0,∞) is bounded,
continuous, and positive definite. A special case is when φ is bounded,
nonincreasing, and convex; see Proposition 2.6 of [20].
5.2. Assumptions (S), (E), and (F). Standard arguments give:
Lemma 5.2. Assume that ψ0 : R
d → [1,∞) is either ψ0(x) = 1 + |x|p for some
p ≥ 1 or ψ0(x) = ep|x| for some p > 0, and let ψ(x) = supt∈[0,T ] ψ0(xt). If∫
Rd
ψ0(x)
2λ0(dx) <∞, σ > 0, |σ(·, 0)| ∈ L2[0, T ], and |σ(t, x)− σ(t, y)| ≤ c‖x− y‖
for some c > 0, then (S.2) holds as long as σ−1b is bounded.
The measurability requirement (F.3) is unusual, but not terribly restrictive. The
more difficult assumption to verify is that of continuity, (F.4). Common assump-
tions in the literature involve continuity with respect to the topology of weak con-
vergence or more generally a Wasserstein metric. For a separable Banach space
(E, ‖ · ‖E) and p ≥ 1, let
WpE,p(µ, µ′) := infpi
∫
E
‖x− y‖pEπ(dx, dy),
where the infimum is over all π ∈ P(E × E) with marginals µ and µ′. When
ψE,p(x) = 1+‖x‖pE, it is known thatWE,p metrizes the weakest topology making the
map PψE,p(E) ∋ µ 7→
∫
φdµ continuous for each continuous function φ ∈ BψE,p(E)
(see Theorem 7.12 of [41]). Thus WE,p is weaker than τψE,p(C), which proves the
following result.
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Lemma 5.3. Let ψ = ψC,p, p ≥ 1. Suppose f and g are (sequentially) continuous
in (µ, q, a) at points with µ ∼ X , for each (t, x), using the metric WC,p on Pψ(C).
Then (F.4) holds.
In most applications the coefficients are Markovian; that is,
f(t, x, µ, q, a) = fˆ(t, xt, µt, q, a), for some fˆ .
Note that for any µ, µ′ ∈ P(C), p ≥ 1, and t ∈ [0, T ],
WRd,p(µt, µ′t) ≤ WC,p(µ, µ′),
and thus the previous proposition includes Markovian data. Note also that assump-
tion (F.4) demands continuity in the measure argument only at the points which
are equivalent to X . Of course, if σ does not depend on X or is uniformly bounded
from below, then Xt ∼ L for all t > 0, and thus in the Markovian case we need only
to check that fˆ is continuous at points which are equivalent to Lebesgue measure.
At no point was a Markov property of any use, and this is why we chose to al-
low path-dependence in each of the coefficients. Moreover, continuity in the spatial
variable was never necessary either. Indeed, we require only that dXt = σ(t,X)dWt
admits a strong solution, as in assumption (S.2), which of course covers the usual
Lipschitz assumption. The most common type of mean field interaction is scalar
and Markovian, so we investigate such cases carefully.
Proposition 5.4 (Scalar dependence on the measure). Consider a function of the
form
f(t, x, µ, q, a) =
∫
C
F (t, xt, yt, q, a)µ(dy) =
∫
Rd
F (t, xt, y, q, a)µt(dy)
where F : [0, T ] × Rd × Rd × P(A) × A → R is jointly measurable and jointly
continuous in its last two arguments whenever the first three are fixed. Let ψ0 :
Rd → [1,∞) be lower semicontinuous, and suppose there exists c > 0 such that
sup
(t,a)∈[0,T ]×A
|F (t, x, y, q, a)| ≤ c(ψ0(x) + ψ0(y))
for all (x, y) ∈ Rd × Rd. Let ψ(x) = supt∈[0,T ] ψ0(xt) for x ∈ C. Then f satisfies
the relevant parts of assumptions (S.3), (S.4), (E), (F).
Proof. Note that ψ : C → [1,∞) is lower-semicontinuous and thus measurable.
Note also that the function C ∋ y 7→ F (t, x, yt, q, a) ∈ R is in Bψ(C) for each
(t, x, q, a) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd×P(A)×A, and thus f is indeed well defined for µ ∈ Pψ(C).
Property (F.2) is obvious, and property (F.5) follows from the inequality
|f(t, x, µ, q, a)| ≤ c
(
ψ0(xt) +
∫
C
ψ0(yt)µ(dy)
)
.
The measurability assumption (F.3) is easy to verify. Condition (E) will follow
from (F.4), which we prove now.
Fix (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× C, and let E = P(A) × A. Let F0(y, η) := F (t, xt, y, η) for
(y, η) ∈ Rd × E. Fix (µ, η) ∈ Pψ(C) × E and a net (µα, ηα) converging to (µ, η).
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We also have µαt → µt in τψ0(Rd). Note that
f(t, x, µα, ηα)− f(t, x, µ, η) =
∫
Rd
(F0(y, η
α)− F0(y, η))µαt (dy)
+
∫
Rd
F0(y, η)(µ
α
t − µt)(dy)
The second term clearly tends to zero. For the first term, fix ǫ > 0. Since E is
compact metric, the function Rd ∋ y 7→ F0(y, ·) ∈ C(E) is measurable, using the
Borel σ-field generated by the supremum norm on the space C(E) of continuous
real-valued functions of E; see Theorem 4.55 of [2]. Thus, by Lusin’s theorem
(12.8 of [2]), there exists a compact set K ⊂ Rd such that ∫
Kc
ψ0 dµt < ǫ and
K ∋ y 7→ F0(y, ·) ∈ C(E) is continuous. Since |F0(y, η′)| ≤ c(ψ0(xt) + ψ0(y)) for
all (y, η′) ∈ Rd × E,∣∣∣∣∫
Rd
(F0(y, η
α)− F0(y, η))µαt (dy)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ sup
y∈K
|F0(y, ηα)− F0(y, η)|
+ 2c
∫
Kc
(ψ0(xt) + ψ0(y))µ
α
t (dy).
It follows from the compactness of E and Lemma 5.6 below that the restriction of
F0 to K×E is uniformly continuous. Since K is compact, we use Lemma 5.6 again
in the other direction to get supy∈K |F0(y, ηα)− F0(y, η)| → 0. Since also
lim
∫
Kc
(ψ0(xt) + ψ0(y))µ
α
t (dy) =
∫
Kc
(ψ0(xt) + ψ0(y))µt(dy) ≤ (1 + ψ0(xt))ǫ,
we have
lim sup
∣∣∣∣∫
Rd
(F0(y, η
α)− F0(y, η))µαt (dy)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2c(1 + ψ0(xt))ǫ.

Corollary 5.5. Let F and ψ0 be as in Proposition 5.4, and suppose
f(t, x, µ, q, a) = G
(
t, xt,
∫
Rd
F (t, xt, y, q, a)µt(dy), q, a
)
,
where G : [0, T ]×Rd ×R×P(A)×A→ R is jointly measurable and continuous in
its last three arguments. If also
|G(t, x, y, q, a)| ≤ c (ψ0(x) + |y|)
for some c > 0, then f satisfies the relevant parts of assumptions (S.3), (S.4), (E),
(F).
We will occasionally need the following simple lemma, which was used in the
proof of Proposition 5.4. Its proof is straightforward and thus omitted.
Lemma 5.6. Let E and K be topological spaces with K compact, let G : E×K → R,
and let x0 ∈ E be fixed. Then G is jointly continuous at points of {x0} ×K if and
only if G(x0, ·) is continuous and x 7→ supy∈K |G(x, y)−G(x0, y)| is continuous at
x0.
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Example 5.7 (Geometric Brownian motion). Requiring σ−1b to be
bounded rather than σ−1 and b each to be bounded notably allows for state pro-
cesses of a geometric Brownian motion type. For example, if d = 1, our assumptions
allow for coefficients of the form
b(t, x, µ, a) = bˆ(t, µ, a)xt,
σ(t, x) = σˆ(t)xt,
where σˆ(t) > 0 for all t and σˆ−1bˆ is bounded.
Remark 5.8. We close the subsection with a remark on the assumption of bound-
edness of σ−1b, which could certainly be relaxed. The reason for this assumption
lies in the BSDE (7.1) for the value function; boundedness of σ−1b equates to a
standard Lipschitz driver, as covered in [36]. The results of Hamadene and Lepeltier
in [23] may be applied if b and σ have linear growth in x and σ is bounded below,
but this increases the technicalities and rules out a direct application of the results
of [24]. However, we only really need [24] in order to treat mean field interactions in
the control, and thus our analysis should still work under appropriate linear growth
assumptions. Our assumptions of boundedness of σ−1b and compactness of A un-
fortunately rule out common linear-quadratic models, but, nonetheless, the same
general techniques could be used to study a large class of linear-quadratic problems
(still, of course, with uncontrolled volatility) in which both these assumptions fail.
More care is required in the choice of admissible controls, and the BSDE for the
value function becomes quadratic in z; this program was carried out for stochastic
optimal control problems in [18], and could presumably be adapted to mean field
games.
5.3. Additional Examples. Corollary 5.5 allows us to treat many mean field
interactions which are not weakly continuous, as they may involve integrals of
discontinuous functions. This is useful in the following examples.
Example 5.9 (Rank effects). Suppose an agent’s reward depends on the rank of
his state process among the population. That is, suppose d = 1 and f(t, x, µ, q, a)
involves a term of the form G(µt(−∞, xt]), where G : [0, 1]→ R is continuous. Such
terms with G monotone are particularly interesting for applications, as suggested
for a model of oil production in [22]. The intuition is that an oil producer prefers
to produce before his competitors, in light of the uncertainty about the longevity
of the oil supply. The state process X represents oil reserves, and G should be
decreasing in their model. Proposition 5.4 shows that the inclusion of such terms
as µt(−∞, xt] in f or g is compatible with all of our assumptions. If b contains
such rank effects, no problem is posed for assumptions (S) and (E), but of course
(F.1) is violated.
Example 5.10 (Types). In [25], Huang, Caines, and Malhame´ consider multiple
types of agents, and a dependence on the mean field within each type. The number
of types is fixed, and an agent cannot change type during the course of the game.
Using the construction of Remark 3.10, we may model this by giving each agent
a random but i.i.d. type at time zero. Alternatively, in some models an agent’s
type may change with his state (or with time, or with his strategy); for example,
a person’s income bracket depends on his wealth. Suppose, for example, that
A1, A2, . . . , Am ⊂ Rd are Borel sets of positive Lebesgue measure, and define Fi :
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P(Rd) → P(Rd) by Fi(µ)(B) := µ(B ∩ Ai)/µ(Ai) when µ(Ai) > 0 and Fi(µ) = 0
otherwise. As long as σ is bounded away from zero, then Xt ∼ L where L is again
Lebesgue measure on Rd, and indeed Fi are τ1(R
d)-continuous at points µ ∼ Xt.
So we can treat functionals of the form
f(t, x, µ, q, a) = G(t, xt, F (µt), q, a),
where F = (F1, . . . , Fm), and G : [0, T ]× Rd × (P(Rd))m × P(A)×A→ R.
6. Applications revisited
Before proving the main results, we return briefly to the models presented in
Section 2, for which we demonstrate the applicability of the existence and approx-
imation theorems (3.5 and 4.2).
6.1. Price impact models. We restrict our attention to finite-volume order books.
We suppose that A ⊂ R is a compact interval containing the origin, c′ : A → R
is continuous and nondecreasing, σ > 0, f : [0, T ] × R → R and g : R → R are
measurable, and finally that there exists c1 > 0 such that
|f(t, x)| + |g(x)| ≤ c1ec1|x|, for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R.
Let c(x) =
∫ x
0
c′(a)da. Assume that X i0 are i.i.d. and that their common distribu-
tion λ0 ∈ P(R) satisfies
∫
R
ep|x|λ0(dx) < ∞ for all p > 0. In the notation of the
paper, we have b(t, x, µ, a) = a, σ(t, x) = σ, f(t, x, µ, q, a) = γxt
∫
A c
′dq − c(a) −
f(t, xt), g(x, µ) = g(xT ), and ψ(x) = e
c1‖x‖.
It is quite easy to check the assumptions of the previous sections, at least with the
help of Lemma 5.2 below, yielding the following theorem. Moreover, in this simple
case we can estimate the rate of convergence, as proven at the end of Section 8.
Proposition 6.1. Under the above assumptions, the existence and approximation
theorems 3.5 and 4.2 apply to the price impact model. Moreover, in the approxima-
tion theorem, there exists a constant C > 0 such that
ǫn ≤ C/
√
n.
6.2. Flocking models. To work around the degeneracy of the diffusion (X i, V i),
we consider only V i as the state variable, and recover X i by making the coefficients
path-dependent. Let b(t, v, µ, a) = a, σ > 0 constant, g ≡ 0, and A ⊂ Rd compact
convex. Define ι : [0, T ]× C → Rd and I : [0, T ]× P(C)→ P(Rd) by
ι(t, v) :=
∫ t
0
vsds, I(t, µ) := µ ◦ ι(t, ·)−1.
Note that ι(t, V i) represents the position of the individual at time t; we are assuming
each individual starts at the origin to keep the notation simple and consistent,
although any initial distribution of positions could be accounted for by using the
construction of Remark 3.10. For flocking models, (2.2) is captured by choosing a
running reward function of the form:
f (1)(t, v, µ, a) = −|α|2R −
∣∣∣∣∫
C
µ(dv′)(v′t − vt)φ(|ι(t, v′ − v)|)
∣∣∣∣2
Q
.
The minus signs are only to turn the problem into a maximization, to be consistent
with the notation of the rest of the paper. Recall that φ : [0,∞) → [0,∞) is
nonincreasing and thus Borel measurable. Assume the initial data V i are i.i.d. and
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square-integrable, with law λ0 ∈ P2(Rd). Take ψ(x) = 1 + ‖x‖2 for x ∈ C. For the
nearest neighbor model, we use
f (2)(t, v, µ, a)
= −|α|2R −
∣∣∣∣ cI(t, µ)(B(ι(t, v), r))
∫
C
µ(dv′)(v′t − vt)1B(ι(t,v),r)(ι(t, v′))
∣∣∣∣2
Q
,
where r > 0 was given, and B(x, r′) denotes the closed ball of radius r′ centered at
x. Consider the second term above to be zero whenever I(t, µ)(B(ι(t, v), r)) = 0.
Finally, for the k-nearest-neighbor model, we choose η ∈ (0, 1) to represent a fixed
percentage of neighbors, which amounts to keeping k/n fixed in the finite-player
game as we send n→∞. We define r : P(Rd)× Rd → [0,∞) by
r(µ, x, y) := inf {r′ > 0 : µ(B(x, r′)) ≥ y} ,
and
f (3)(t, v, µ, a)
= −|α|2R −
∣∣∣∣ cη
∫
C
µ(dv′)(v′t − vt)1B(ι(t,v),r(I(t,µ),ι(t,v)),η)(ι(t, v′))
∣∣∣∣2
Q
.
It is straightforward to check that the objective (2.4) for the nearest neighbor
models is equivalent to maximizing
E
∫ T
0
f (1)(t, V i, µn, αit)dt, where µ
n =
1
n
n∑
j=1
δV j ,
replacing f (1) by f (2) in the case of the k-nearest neighbor model.
Proposition 6.2. Under the above assumptions, the existence and approximation
theorems 3.5 and 4.2 apply to each of the flocking models.
Proof. Assumptions (S.1), (S.4), (S.5), (C), (F.1), (F.2), and (F.5) are easy to
check. Lemma 5.2 below takes care of (S.2). Also, (S.3) and (F.3) are clear for
f (1) and f (2), and follow from Lemma 6.3 below for f (3). It remains to check the
continuity assumption (F.4). For f (1), this follows from Proposition 5.4 below.
Apply Itoˆ’s formula to tWt to get
ι(t,X) =
∫ t
0
Xsds =
∫ t
0
(ξ + σWs)ds = tξ + σtWt − σ
∫ t
0
sdWs.
Since ξ and W are independent, we see that I(t,X ) ∼ L for t ∈ (0, T ], where
L denotes Lebesgue measure on Rd. Hence I(t, µ) ∼ L for µ ∼ X , and so µ 7→
1/I(t, µ)(B(x, r)) is τψ(C)-continuous at points µ ∼ X , for each (x, r) ∈ Rd×(0,∞).
This along with Proposition 5.4 below establish (F.4) for f (2). Finally, we prove
(F.4) for f (3). Fix (t, v) ∈ (0, T ]× C, and define
Bµ := B (ι(t, v), r(I(t, µ), ι(t, v), η)) ,
F (µ) :=
∫
C
(v′t − vt)1Bµ(ι(t, v′))µ(dv′),
for µ ∈ Pψ(C). In light of Lemma 5.3 and the discussion preceding it, it suffices to
show F is WC,2-continuous at points µ ∼ X . Let µn → µ in WC,2 with µ ∼ X , and
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note that I(t, µ) ∼ I(t,X ) ∼ L. Then
F (µn)− F (µ) =
∫
C
(v′t − vt)
(
1Bµn − 1Bµ
)
(ι(t, v′))µ(dv′)
+
∫
C
(v′t − vt)1Bµn (ι(t, v′))[µn − µ](dv′)
=: In + IIn.
Note that I(t, µn)→ I(t, µ) weakly, and thus
r(I(t, µn), ι(t, x), η)→ r(I(t, µ), ι(t, x), η)
by Lemma 6.3. Since 1Bµn → 1Bµ holds L-a.e. (and thus I(t, µ)-a.e.) and
∫
C(v
′
t −
vt)[µ
n − µ](dv′)→ 0, the dominated convergence theorem yields In → 0. To show
IIn → 0, note that note that
I(t, (v′t − vt)µn(dv′))→ I(t, (v′t − vt)µ(dv′)), weakly.
Since the latter measure is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure,
Theorem 4.2 of [38] implies
IIn = [I(t, (v
′
t − vt)µn(dv′))− I(t, (v′t − vt)µ(dv′))] (Bµn)→ 0.
In fact, we should consider separately the positive and negative parts of each of the
d components of the signed vector measures (v′t − vt)µn(dv′), since Theorem 4.2 of
[38] is stated only for nonnegative real-valued measures. 
Lemma 6.3. The function r is empirically measurable, and r(·, x, y) is weakly
continuous at points µ ∼ L.
Proof. To prove measurability, note that for any c > 0
{(z, x, y) : r(en(z), x, y) > c} =
{
(z, x, y) :
1
n
n∑
i=1
1B(x,c)(zi) < y
}
is clearly a Borel set in (Rd)n×Rd×(0, 1) for each n. To prove continuity, let µn → µ
weakly in P(Rd) with µ ∼ L. Let ǫ > 0. Since µ ∼ L, the map r 7→ µ(B(x, r))
is continuous and strictly increasing. Thus the inverse function r(µ, x, ·) is also
continuous, and we may find δ > 0 such that |r(µ, x, y) − r(µ, x, z)| < ǫ whenever
|z − y| ≤ δ. Theorem 4.2 of [38] tells us that µn(B) → µ(B) uniformly over
measurable convex sets B, since µ≪ L. Hence, for n sufficiently large,
sup
(x,r)∈Rd×(0,∞)
|µ(B(x, r)) − µn(B(x, r))| < δ.
Thus, for sufficiently large n,
r(µn, x, y) = inf {r′ > 0 : µ(B(x, r′)) ≥ y + (µ− µn)(B(x, r′))}
≥ inf {r′ > 0 : µ(B(x, r′)) ≥ y − δ}
= r(µ, x, y − δ) ≥ r(µ, x, y)− ǫ,
and similarly
r(µn, x, y) ≤ inf {r′ > 0 : µ(B(x, r′)) ≥ y + δ} = r(µ, x, y + δ) ≤ r(µ, x, y) + ǫ.

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7. Proofs of existence and uniqueness theorems
This section is devoted to the proofs of the existence and uniqueness results
of Theorems 3.5 and 3.8. Throughout the section, we work with the canonical
probability space described in the second paragraph of Section 3. Since BSDEs will
be used repeatedly, it is important to note that the classical existence, uniqueness,
and comparison results for BSDEs do indeed hold in our setting, despite the fact
that F is not the Brownian filtration. The purpose of working with the Brownian
filtration is of course for martingale representation, which we still have with our
slightly larger filtration: It follows from Theorem 4.33 of [28], for example, that
every square integrable F-martingale (Mt)0≤t≤T admits the representation Mt =
M0 +
∫ t
0
φsdWs for some φ ∈ H2,d. However, note that in our case the initial value
of the solution of a BSDE is random, since F0 is not trivial.
To find a fixed point for the law of the control, we will make use of the spaceM
of positive Borel measures ν on [0, T ]× P(A) (using the weak topology on P(A))
whose first projection is Lebesgue measure; that is, ν([s, t] × P(A)) = t − s for
0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T . Endow M with the weakest topology making the map ν 7→∫
φdν continuous for each bounded measurable function φ : [0, T ] × P(A) → R
for which φ(t, ·) is continuous for each t. This is known as the stable topology,
which was studied thoroughly by Jacod and Me´min in [27]. In particular, since
A is a compact metrizable space, so is P(A), and thus so is M. Note that a
measure ν ∈ M disintegrates into ν(dt, dq) = νt(dq)dt, where the measurable map
[0, T ] ∋ t 7→ νt ∈ P(P(A)) is uniquely determined up to almost everywhere equality.
For any bounded measurable function F : P(A)→ Rk, we extend F to P(P(A)) in
the natural way by defining
F (ν) :=
∫
P(A)
ν(dq)F (q).
In this way, F (δq) = F (q) for q ∈ P(A).
Remark 7.1. Because of condition (S.5), the aforementioned convention will not
lead to any confusion regarding the meaning of H(t, x, µ, ν, z), for ν ∈ P(P(A)). In
particular, it is consistent with the relationship
H(t, x, µ, ν, a) := sup
a∈A
h(t, x, µ, ν, z, a),
since the only dependence of h on ν is outside of the supremum.
For each (µ, ν) ∈ Pψ(C)×M, we now construct the corresponding control prob-
lem. The standing assumptions (S) are in force throughout, and the following con-
struction is valid without any of the other assumptions. Recall the definitions of h
and H from (3.2) in Section 3. That (t, x, z) 7→ H(t, x, µ, νt, z) is jointly measur-
able for each (µ, ν) follows, for example, from the measurable maximum Theorem
18.19 of [2]. Boundedness of σ−1b guarantees that H is uniformly Lipschitz in z.
Since µ ∈ Pψ(C), it follows from assumptions (S.2) and (S.4) that g(X,µ) ∈ L2(P )
and that (H(t,X, µ, νt, 0))0≤t≤T = (supa f(t,X, µ, νt, a))0≤t≤T ∈ H2,1. Hence the
classical result of Pardoux and Peng [36] (or rather a slight extension thereof, as re-
marked above) applies, and there exists a unique solution (Y µ,ν , Zµ,ν) ∈ H2,1×H2,d
of the BSDE
Y µ,νt = g(X,µ) +
∫ T
t
H(s,X, µ, νs, Z
µ,ν
s )ds−
∫ T
t
Zµ,νs dWs. (7.1)
22 RENE´ CARMONA AND DANIEL LACKER
For each α ∈ A, we may similarly solve the BSDE
Y µ,ν,αt = g(X,µ) +
∫ T
t
h(s,X, µ, νs, Z
µ,ν,α
s , αs)ds−
∫ T
t
Zµ,ν,αs dWs
= g(X,µ) +
∫ T
t
f(s,X, µ, νs, αs)ds−
∫ T
t
Zµ,ν,αs dW
µ,α
s .
Since Wµ,α is a Wiener process under Pµ,α and Y µ,α is adapted, we get
Y µ,ν,αt = E
µ,α
[
g(X,µ) +
∫ T
t
f(s,X, µ, νs, αs)ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
.
In particular, E[Y µ,ν,α0 ] = J
µ,ν(α).
It is immediate from the comparison principle for BSDEs (e.g. Theorem 2.2 of
[30]) that E[Y µ,ν0 ] ≥ E[Y µ,ν,α0 ] = Jµ,ν(α) for each α ∈ A, and thus E[Y µ,ν0 ] ≥ V µ,ν .
By a well-known measurable selection theorem (e.g. Theorem 18.19 of [2]), there
exists a function αˆ : [0, T ]× C × Pψ(C)× Rd → A such that
αˆ(t, x, µ, z) ∈ A(t, x, µ, z), for all (t, x, µ, z), (7.2)
and such that for each µ the map (t, x, z) 7→ αˆ(t, x, µ, z) is jointly measurable with
respect to the progressive σ-field on [0, T ]× C and B(Rd). Letting
αµ,νt := αˆ(t,X, µ, Z
µ,ν
t ), (7.3)
the uniqueness of solutions of BSDEs implies Y µ,νt = Y
µ,ν,αµ,ν
t , which in turn implies
V µ,ν = Jµ,ν(αµ,ν) since Jµ,ν(αµ,ν) ≤ V µ,ν .
The process αµ,ν is an optimal control, but so is any process in the set
A(µ, ν) := {α ∈ A : αt ∈ A(t,X, µ, Zµ,νt ) dt× dP − a.e.} . (7.4)
Define Φ : Pψ(C)× A→ P(C)×M by
Φ(µ, α) := (Pµ,α ◦X−1, δPµ,α◦α−1t (dq)dt)
The goal now is to find a point (µ, ν) ∈ Pψ(C)×M for which there exists α ∈ A(µ, ν)
such that (µ, ν) = Φ(µ, α). In other words, we seek a fixed point of the set-valued
map (µ, ν) 7→ Φ(µ,A(µ, ν)) := {Φ(µ, α) : α ∈ A(µ, ν)}. Note that under condition
(U.1), αµ,ν is the unique element of A(µ, ν) (up to almost everywhere equality),
and this reduces to a fixed point problem for a single-valued function.
Remark 7.2. It is worth emphasizing that the preceding argument demonstrates
that the set A(µ, ν) is always nonempty, under only the standing assumptions (S).
Remark 7.3. The main difficulty in the analysis is the adjoint process Zµ,ν . Note
that for each (µ, ν) there exists a progressively measurable function ζµ,ν : [0, T ]×
C → Rd such that Zµ,νt = ζµ,ν(t,X). If we choose a measurable selection αˆ as in
(7.2), any weak solution of the following McKean-Vlasov SDE provides a solution
of the MFG: {
dXt = b(t,X, µ, αˆ(t,X, µ, ζµ,ν(t,X)))dt+ σ(t,X)dWt,
X ∼ µ, µ ◦ (αˆ(t, ·, µ, ζµ,ν(t, ·)))−1 = νt a.e.
The notation X ∼ µ means that µ should equal the law of X . This map ζµ,ν is
typically quite inaccessible, which is why we do not appeal to any existing results
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on McKean-Vlasov equations, even when ν is not present. All such results require
some kind of continuity of the map
(x, µ) 7→ b(t, x, µ, αˆ(t, x, µ, ζµ,ν (t, x))),
as far as the authors know. It is possible to make assumptions on the data which
would guarantee, for example, that ζµ,ν(t, ·) is continuous, but continuous depen-
dence on µ would be a much trickier matter.
7.1. Some results of set-valued analysis. We precede the main proofs with
some useful lemmas. Without assumption (U), the optimal controls need not be
unique, and thus we will need a fixed point theorem for set-valued maps. We first
summarize some terminology from set-valued analysis.
For a point y in a metric space (E, d) and δ > 0, let B(y, δ) denote the open
ball of radius δ centered at y. Similarly, for F ⊂ E, let B(F, δ) = {x ∈ E :
infy∈F d(x, y) < δ}. For two subsets F,G of E, we (abusively) define
d(F,G) := sup
y∈G
d(F, y) = sup
y∈G
inf
x∈F
d(x, y).
Note that d is not symmetric. If K is another metric space, a set-valued function
Γ : K → 2E is said to be upper hemicontinuous at x ∈ K if for all ǫ > 0 there
exists δ > 0 such that Γ(B(x, δ)) ⊂ B(Γ(x), ǫ). It is straightforward to prove that
Γ is upper hemicontinuous at x ∈ K if and only if d(Γ(x),Γ(xn)) → 0 for every
sequence xn converging to x.
In order to relax somewhat the convexity assumption of Kakutani’s fixed point
theorem, we adapt results of Cellina in [13] to derive a slight generalization of
Kakutani’s theorem, which will assist in the proof of Theorem 3.5.
Proposition 7.4. Let K be a compact convex metrizable subset of a locally convex
topological vector space, and let E be a normed vector space. Suppose Γ : K → 2E is
upper hemicontinuous and has closed and convex values, and suppose φ : K×E → K
is continuous. Then there exists x ∈ K such that x ∈ φ(x,Γ(x)) := {φ(x, y) : y ∈
Γ(x)}.
Proof. LetGr(Γ) := {(x, y) ∈ K×E : y ∈ Γ(x)} denote the graph of Γ. By Cellina’s
result (Theorem 1 of [13]), for each positive integer n we may find a continuous
(singe-valued) function γn : K → E such that the graph of γn is contained in the
1/n neighborhood of Gr(Γ). That is, for all x ∈ K,
d((x, γn(x)), Gr(Γ)) := inf {d ((x, γn(x)), (y, z)) : y ∈ K, z ∈ Γ(y)} < 1/n,
where d denotes some metric on K × E. Since K ∋ x 7→ φ(x, γn(x)) ∈ K is
continuous, Schauder’s fixed point theorem implies that there exists xn ∈ K such
that xn = φ(xn, γn(xn)). By Lemma 17.8 and Theorem 17.10 of [2], Γ(K) :=⋃
x∈K Γ(x) ⊂ X is compact and Gr(Γ) is closed. Thus Gr(Γ) ⊂ K × Γ(K) is
compact. Since d((xn, γn(x)), Gr(Γ)) → 0 and Gr(Γ) is compact, there exist a
subsequence xnk and a point (x, y) ∈ Gr(Γ) such that (xnk , γnk(xnk )) → (x, y).
This completes the proof, since y ∈ Γ(x) and since continuity of φ yields
x = limxnk = limφ(xnk , γnk(xnk)) = φ(x, y).

A special case of Berge’s maximum theorem (17.31 of [2]) will be useful:
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Theorem 7.5 (Berge’s Theorem). Let E be a metric space, K a compact metric
space, and φ : E × K → R a continuous function. Then γ(x) := maxy∈K φ(x, y)
is continuous, and the following set-valued function is upper hemicontinuous and
compact-valued:
E ∋ x 7→ argmax
y∈K
φ(x, y) := {y ∈ K : γ(x) = φ(x, y)} ∈ 2K
7.2. Proof of Theorem 3.5 (existence). We now turn toward the proof of The-
orem 3.5. In what follows, we always use the topology τψ(C) on Pψ(C), except when
stated otherwise. Despite its simplicity, we state the following result as a lemma
for later references.
Lemma 7.6. Let (E, E) and (F,F) be measurable spaces, and let µ, ν ∈ P(E) with
ν ≪ µ. If X : E → F is measurable, then
dν ◦X−1
dµ ◦X−1 ◦X = E
µ
[
dν
dµ
∣∣∣∣X] µ− a.s.
Lemma 7.7. For any q ∈ R with |q| ≥ 1, we have (recall that X := P ◦X−1)
Mq := sup
(µ,α)∈Pψ(C)×A
∫
(dΦ(µ, α)/dX )q dX <∞. (7.5)
Proof. Recall that σ−1b is bounded, say by c > 0. Fix (µ, α) ∈ Pψ(C)×A. Letting
Nt :=
∫ t
0 σ
−1b(t,X, µ, αt)dWt, we see that [N,N ]T ≤ Tc2, and thus, since q(q−1) ≥
0,
E(N)qT = E(qN)T exp (q(q − 1)[N,N ]T /2) ≤ E(qN)T exp
(
q(q − 1)Tc2/2) .
Hence, Lemma 7.6 and Jensen’s inequality yield∫
(dΦ(µ, α)/dX )q dX = E [E [dPµ,α/dP |X ]q] ≤ E [(dPµ,α/dP )q]
≤ exp (q(q − 1)Tc2/2) .
Since this bound is independent of (µ, α), we indeed have Mq <∞. 
In terms of the notation from Lemma 7.7, let M := max(M2,M−1). Let
Q :=
{
µ ∈ Pψ(C) : µ ∼ X ,
∫
(dµ/dX )2dX ≤M,
∫
(dX/dµ)dX ≤M
}
. (7.6)
By construction, the range of Φ is contained in Q × M. Critical to our fixed
point theorem is the following compactness result, which probably exists in various
forms elsewhere in the literature. Part of the result may be found, for example, in
Lemma 6.2.16 of [16]. But, for lack of a concise reference, and to keep the paper
fairly self-contained, we include a complete proof of the following:
Proposition 7.8. The space (Q, τψ(C)) is convex, compact, and metrizable. More-
over, τ1(C) and τψ(C) induce the same topology on Q.
Proof. Of course, by τ1(C) we mean τφ(C) with φ ≡ 1. Define
Q1 =
{
µ ∈ P(C) : µ≪ X ,
∫
(dµ/dX )2dX ≤M
}
,
Q2 =
{
µ ∈ P(C) : µ ∼ X ,
∫
(dX/dµ)dX ≤M
}
.
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Cleary each set is convex. We will show that Q1 is compact and metrizable under
τ1(C), that Q2 is τ1(C)-closed, and that τ1(C) and τψ(C) induce the same topology
on Q1.
Let q ∈ R with |q| ≥ 1. The set Kq := {Z ∈ L1(X ) : Z ≥ 0 X −a.s.,
∫ |Z|qdX ≤
M} is clearly convex. It is also norm-closed: if Zn → Z in L1(X ) with Zn ∈
Kq, then Zn → Z X -a.s. along a subsequence, and thus Fatou’s lemma yields∫ |Z|qdX ≤ lim inf ∫ |Zn|qdX ≤M . Hence, Kq is weakly closed (see Theorem 5.98
of [2]). For q > 1, the set Kq is uniformly integrable and thus weakly compact,
by the Dunford-Pettis theorem; moreover, Kq is metrizable, since it is a weakly
compact subset of separable Banach space (Theorem V.6.3 of [17]). Now, for µ≪
X , define F (µ) := dµ/dX . Then F is a homeomorphism from (Q2, τ1(C)) to K−1
equipped with the weak topology of L1(X ), and so Q2 is τ1(C)-closed. Similarly,
F is a homeomorphism from (Q1, τ1(C)) to K2 with the weak topology, and so
(Q1, τ1(C)) is compact and metrizable.
It remains to prove that τ1(C) and τψ(C) coincide on Q1. Let φ ∈ Bψ(C) with
|φ| ≤ ψ, µ ∈ Pψ(C), and ǫ > 0, and define U = {ν ∈ Pψ(C) : |
∫
φd(ν − µ)| < ǫ}.
Since τψ(C) is stronger than τ1(C), it suffices to find a τ1(C)-neighborhood V of µ
with V ∩ Q1 ⊂ U ∩ Q1. First, note that for any c > 0 and ν ∈ Q1, the Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality yields(∫
{ψ≥c}
ψ dν
)2
≤
∫ (
dν
dX
)2
dX
∫
{ψ≥c}
ψ2dX ≤M
∫
{ψ≥c}
ψ2dX .
Since
∫
ψ2dX <∞ by (S.2), we may find c > 0 such that ∫
{ψ≥c}
ψ dν ≤ ǫ/3 for all
ν ∈ Q1. Then, for any ν ∈ Q1,∣∣∣∣∫ φd(ν − µ)∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
{ψ<c}
φd(ν − µ)
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
{ψ≥c}
φdν
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
{ψ≥c}
φdµ
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 2ǫ
3
+
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
{ψ<c}
φd(ν − µ)
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Set V = {ν ∈ P(C) : | ∫{ψ<c} φd(ν − µ)| < ǫ/3}, so that V ∩ Q1 ⊂ U ∩ Q1. Since
|φ| ≤ ψ, we have φ1{ψ<c} ∈ B1(C), and thus V ∈ τ1(C). 
The next two lemmas pertain to the Zµ,ν terms that arise in the BSDE repre-
sentations above; in particular, a kind of continuity of the map (µ, ν) 7→ Zµ,ν is
needed.
Lemma 7.9. Suppose assumption (E) holds. Then for each (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × C,
the function Q × P(A) × Rd ∋ (µ, q, z) 7→ H(t, x, µ, q, z) is continuous, and the
set-valued function Q× Rd ∋ (µ, z) 7→ A(t, x, µ, z) is upper hemicontinuous.
Proof. Since Q is metrizable by Lemma 7.8, this is simply a combination of as-
sumption (E) with Theorem 7.5, using E = Q × P(A) × Rd and K = A. Recall
from (S.1) that A is compact. 
Lemma 7.10. Suppose assumption (E) holds. Suppose (µn, νn)→ (µ, ν) in Q×M,
using τψ(C) on Q. Then
lim
n→∞
E
[∫ T
0
∣∣∣Zµn,νnt − Zµ,νt ∣∣∣2 dt
]
= 0.
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Proof. Note that the functions H(s, x, µ′, ν′, ·) have the same Lipschitz constant for
each (t, x, µ′, ν′), coinciding with the uniform bound for σ−1b. Assumption (S.4)
implies
E
[∫ T
0
|H(t,X, µn, νnt , 0)|2dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
sup
a∈A
|f(t,X, µ′, ν′t, a)|2dt
]
≤ 2c2TE[ψ2(X)] + 2c2Tρ2
(∫
ψ dµn
)
for all 1 ≤ n ≤ ∞, where (µ∞, ν∞) := (µ, ν). Since µn ∈ Pψ(C) and µn → µ in
τψ(C) it follows that supn
∫
ψ dµn <∞. Since ρ is increasing and nonnegative,
sup
n
ρ2
(∫
ψ dµn
)
= ρ2
(
sup
n
∫
ψ dµn
)
<∞. (7.7)
Assumption (S.2) yields E[ψ2(X)] < ∞. Hence, we will be able to conclude via a
convergence result for BSDEs proven by Hu and Peng in [24], as soon as we show
that
In := E
[
|g(X,µn)− g(X,µ)|2
]
→ 0,
and
IIn := E
(∫ T
t
(H(s,X, µ, νs, Z
µ,ν
s )−H(s,X, µn, νns , Zµ,νs ))ds
)2→ 0,
for all t ∈ [0, T ].
We first check that the integrands of In and IIn are uniformly integrable. As-
sumption (S.4) gives
|g(X,µn)− g(X,µ)| ≤ c
(
2ψ(X) + ρ
(∫
ψ dµ
)
+ ρ
(∫
ψ dµn
))
,
which is indeed square integrable in light of (S.2) and (7.7). Note that
|H(t,X, µ,νt, Zµ,νt )−H(t,X, µn, νnt , Zµ,νt )|
≤ sup
a∈A
∣∣f(t,X, µ, νt, a) + Zµ,νt · σ−1b(t,X, µ, a)
−f(t,X, µn, νnt , a)− Zµ,νt · σ−1b(t,X, µn, a)
∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∆f,nt ∣∣∣+ |Zµ,νt ||∆b,nt |. (7.8)
where
∆f,nt := sup
a∈A
|f(t,X, µ, νt, a)− f(t,X, µn, νnt , a)| , and
∆b,nt := sup
a∈A
∣∣σ−1b(t,X, µ, a)− σ−1b(t,X, µn, a)∣∣ .
Again, (S.4) lets us bound |∆f,n| by the same term with which we bounded |g(X,µn)−
g(X,µ)|. Since Zµ,ν ∈ H2,1 and |∆b,n| is bounded, the integrands are indeed uni-
formly integrable.
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It is clear now that In → 0, because of assumption (E) and the dominated
convergence theorem. Rewrite IIn as
IIn =E
[∣∣∣∣∣
∫ T
t
ds
(∫
P(A)
νs(dq)H(s,X, µ, q, Z
µ,ν
s )−
∫
P(A)
νns (dq)H(s,X, µ
n, q, Zµ,νs )
)∣∣∣∣∣
2
 .
For fixed s and ω, the function Q×P(A) ∋ (µ′, q) 7→ H(s,X, µ′, q, Zµ,νs ) is contin-
uous, by Lemma 7.9. Compactness of P(A) implies that the function Q ∋ µ′ 7→
H(s,X, µ′, q, Zµ,νs ) is continuous, uniformly in q (see Lemma 5.6). Thus∫
P(A)
νns (dq)H(s,X, µ
n, q, Zµ,νs )−
∫
P(A)
νns (dq)H(s,X, µ, q, Z
µ,ν
s )→ 0.
By definition of the stable topology of M, we also have∫ T
t
ds
∫
P(A)
(νns − νs)(dq)H(s,X, µ, q, Zµ,νs )→ 0.
It is now clear that IIn → 0, and the proof is complete. 
The last ingredient of the proof is to establish the applicability of Proposition
7.4. Note that A is a compact subset of a normed space, say (A′, ‖ · ‖A), and thus
A may also be viewed as a subset of the normed space of (equivalence classes of
dt× dP -a.e. equal) progressively measurable A′-valued processes, with the norm
‖α‖A := E
∫ T
0
‖αt‖Adt.
Lemma 7.11. Under assumptions (E) and (C), the function A : Q ×M → 2A
defined by (7.4) is upper hemicontinuous and has closed and convex values.
Proof. Convexity follows immediately from assumption (C). We first show A(·)
has closed values. Let L denote Lebesgue measure on [0, T ]. Note that ‖ · ‖A is
bounded on A, and thus ‖ · ‖A metrizes convergence in L × P -measure. To prove
closedness, fix a sequence αn ∈ A(µ, ν) such that ‖αn − α‖A → 0 for some α ∈ A.
By passing to a subsequence, we may assume αnt (ω) → αt(ω) for all (t, ω) ∈ N ,
for some N ⊂ [0, T ]× Ω with L × P (N) = 1. We may assume also that αnt (ω) ∈
A(t,X(ω), µ, Zµ,νt (ω)) for all n and (t, ω) ∈ N . By Theorem 7.5, for each (t, ω) the
set A(t,X(ω), µ, Zµ,νt (ω)) ⊂ A is compact, and thus αt(ω) ∈ A(t,X(ω), µ, Zµ,νt (ω))
for all (t, ω) ∈ N .
To prove upper hemicontinuity, let (µn, νn)→ (µ, ν) in Q×M. We must show
that
d(A(µ, ν),A(µn, νn)) = sup
αn∈A(µn,νn)
inf
α∈A(µ,ν)
E
∫ T
0
‖αnt − αt‖Adt→ 0.
Define
At(ω) := A(t,X(ω), µ, Z
µ,ν
t (ω)),
Ant (ω) := A(t,X(ω), µ
n, Zµ
n,νn
t (ω)),
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and
cnt (ω) := d (At(ω), A
n
t (ω))
= sup {inf {‖a− b‖A : b ∈ At(ω)} : a ∈ Ant (ω)} .
Lemma 7.10 implies that Zµ
n,νn → Zµ,ν in L × P -measure; it follows then from
upper hemicontinuity of A(t, x, ·, ·) (Lemma 7.9) that cn → 0 in L × P -measure as
well. Since of course cn is bounded, the proof will be complete once we establish
sup
αn∈A(µn,νn)
inf
α∈A(µ,ν)
E
∫ T
0
‖αnt − αt‖Adt = E
∫ T
0
cnt dt.
To prove that we can pass the infimum and supremum inside of the integrals,
we first use Theorem 18.19 of [2] to draw a number of conclusions. First, the map
(t, ω) 7→ At(ω) is measurable, in the sense of Definition 18.1 of [2], and thus also
weakly measurable since it is compact-valued (see Lemma 18.2 of [2]). Second,
there exists a measurable function βˆ : [0, T ]× Ω×A→ A such that
‖a− βˆ(t, ω, a)‖A = inf {‖a− b‖A : b ∈ At(ω)} ,
βˆ(t, ω, a) ∈ At(ω).
Note that for any αn ∈ A, the process βˆ(t, ω, αnt (ω)) is in A(µ, ν). Hence, we may
exchange the infimum and the expectation to get
inf
α∈A(µ,ν)
E
∫ T
0
‖αnt − αt‖Adt = E
∫ T
0
inf {‖αnt − b‖A : b ∈ At(ω)} dt,
It follows from Theorem 7.5 that a 7→ inf {‖a− b‖A : b ∈ At(ω)} is continuous for
each (t, ω). Hence, Theorem 18.19 of [2] also tells us that there exists a measurable
selection βˆn : [0, T ]× Ω→ A such that
cnt (ω) = inf
{
‖βˆn(t, ω)− b‖A : b ∈ At(ω)
}
,
βˆn(t, ω) ∈ Ant (ω).
The process βˆn(t, ω) is in A(µn, νn), and so we exchange the supremum and the
expectation to get
sup
αn∈A(µn,νn)
E
∫ T
0
inf {‖αnt − b‖A : b ∈ At(ω)} dt = E
∫ T
0
cnt dt.

Proof of Theorem 3.5. The proof of Theorem 3.5 is an application of Proposition
7.4, with K = Q ×M and E = A. Let S denote the vector space of bounded
measurable functions φ : [0, T ]× P(A)→ R such that φ(t, ·) is continuous for each
t. Endow S with the supremum norm, and let S∗ denote its continuous dual space.
Note that M⊂ S∗. Let Y := Bψ(C)⊕ S, endowed with the norm
‖(φ, η)‖Y := sup
x∈C
|φ(x)|
ψ(x)
+ sup
(t,q)∈[0,T ]×P(A)
|η(t, q)|.
The dual of Y is Y∗ = B∗ψ(C)⊕S∗, which contains Q×M as a subset. Using τψ(C)
on Q, the product topology of Q×M coincides with the topology induced by the
weak*-topology of Y∗. By Lemma 7.7, the function Φ takes values in Q×M, noting
that Q×M is convex and compact by Lemma 7.8. Let τM denote the topology of
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M. To prove that Φ : (Q, τψ(C))×(A, ‖·‖A)→ (Q, τψ(C))×(M, τM) is continuous,
Lemma 7.8 tells us that it suffices to show that Φ : (Q, τψ(C)) × (A, ‖ · ‖A) →
(Q, τ1(C))× (M, τM) is sequentially continuous. We will instead prove the stronger
statement that Φ : (Q, τψ(C)) × (A, ‖ · ‖A) → (Q,V1) × (M, τM) is sequentially
continuous, where V1 denotes the total variation metric,
V1(µ, ν) := sup
∫
φd(µ− ν),
where the supremum is over measurable real-valued functions φ with |φ| ≤ 1. De-
note by H(ν|µ) the relative entropy,
H(ν|µ) =
{∫
log dνdµdν if ν ≪ µ
+∞ otherwise.
Now let (µn, αn)→ (µ, α) in (Q, τψ(C))×(A, ‖·‖A). We first show that Pµn,αn →
Pµ,α. By Pinsker’s inequality, it suffices to show
H(Pµ,α|Pµn,αn))→ 0.
Since
dPµ
n,αn
dPµ,α
= E
(∫ ·
0
(
σ−1b (t,X, µn, αnt )− σ−1b (t,X, µ, αt)
)
dWµ,αt
)
T
,
and since σ−1b is bounded, we compute
H(Pµ,α|Pµn,αn) = −Eµ,α
[
log
dPµ
n,αn
dPµ,α
]
=
1
2
E
µ,α
[∫ T
0
∣∣σ−1b (t,X, µn, αnt )− σ−1b (t,X, µ, αt)∣∣2 dt
]
.
Since Pµ,α ∼ P and αn → α in L × P -measure, it follows from Lemma 7.10 that
Zµ
n,νn → Zµ,ν in L× Pµ,α-measure, where L denotes Lebesgue measure on [0, T ].
By assumption (E), the map σ−1b(t, x, ·, ·) is continuous for each (t, x). Conclude
from the bounded convergence theorem that Pµ
n,αn → Pµ,α in total variation. It
follows immediately that Pµ
n,αn ◦X−1 → Pµ,α ◦X−1 in total variation, and that
V1
(
Pµ
n,αn ◦ (αnt )−1, Pµ,α ◦ (αnt )−1
)
≤ V1
(
Pµ
n,αn , Pµ,α
)
→ 0.
Moreover, Pµ,α◦(αnt )−1 → Pµ,α◦α−1t in L-measure, since αn → α in L×P -measure.
Thus Pµ
n,αn ◦ (αnt )−1 → Pµ,α ◦ α−1t in L-measure, which finally implies
δPµn,αn◦(αnt )−1(dq)dt→ δPµ,α◦α−1t (dq)dt, in M.
With continuity of Φ established, Φ and A(·) verify the assumptions of Proposi-
tion 7.4, and thus there exists a fixed point (µ, ν) ∈ Φ(µ,A(µ, ν)) = {Φ(µ, α) : α ∈
A(µ, ν)}. It remains to notice that the function Φ takes values in Q×M0, where
M0 :={ν ∈ M : ν(dt, dq) = δqˆ(t)(dq)dt
for some measurable qˆ : [0, T ]→ P(A)} .
For an element in M0, the correponding map qˆ is uniquely determined, up to
almost everywhere equality. Hence, for our fixed point (µ, ν), we know that there
exist α ∈ A(µ, ν) and a measurable function qˆ : [0, T ]→ P(A) such that νt = δqˆ(t)
and qˆ(t) = Pµ,α ◦ α−1t for almost every t. 
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Remark 7.12. Assume for the moment that there is no mean field interaction in
the control. Following the notation of Remark 7.3, we may ask if the SDE
dXt = b(t,X, µ, αˆ(t,X, µ, ζµ(t,X)))dt+ σ(t,X)dWt,
admits a strong solution, with µ equal to the law of X . This would allow us to solve
the mean field game in a strong sense, on a given probability space, as is required in
[11] and [6]. Since ζµ(t,X) = Z
µ
t , this forward SDE is coupled with the backward
SDE: 
dXt = b(t,X, µ, αˆ(t,X, µ, Zt))dt+ σ(t,X)dWt,
dYt = −H(t,X, µ, Zt)dt+ ZtdWt,
µ0 = λ0, X ∼ µ, YT = g(X,µ).
To solve the mean field game in a strong sense, one must therefore resolve this
“mean field FBSDE”, studied in some generality in [9]. The solution must consist
of (X,Y, Z, µ), such that (X,Y, Z) are processes adapted to the filtration generated
by (Wt, X0)t∈[0,T ] and satisfying the above SDEs, and such that the law of X is
µ. Our formulation is a relaxation of the more common formulation (e.g. [11]
and [6]) in that the forward SDEs no longer need to be solved in a strong sense.
Note, however, that the FBSDE written here is of a different nature from those of
[11, 6], which were obtained from the maximum principle. Our FBSDE is more like
a stochastic form of the PDE systems of Lasry and Lions; indeed, in the Markovian
case, the Feynman-Kac formula for the backward part is nothing but the HJB
equation.
7.3. Proof of Theorem 3.8 (uniqueness).
Proof of Theorem 3.8. Recall that A(µ, ν) is always nonempty, as in Remark 7.2.
By condition (U.1), we know A(µ, ν) is a singleton for each (µ, ν) ∈ Pψ(C) ×M.
Its unique element αµ,ν is defined given by
αµ,νt = αˆ(t,X, Z
µ,ν
t ),
where the function αˆ is defined as in (7.2); note that assumptions (U.2) and
(U.3) imply that αˆ = αˆ(t, x, z) does not depend on µ or ν. Suppose now that
(µ1, ν1), (µ2, ν2) ∈ Pψ(C) ×M are two solutions of the MFG; that is, they are
fixed points of the (single-valued) function Φ(·,A(·)). Abbreviate Y i = Y µi,νi ,
Zi = Zµ
i,νi , αi = αµ
i,νi , f it := f(t,X, µ
i, νit , α
i
t) and b
i
t := σ
−1b(t,X, αit). We begin
by rewriting the BSDEs (7.1) in two ways:
d(Y 1t − Y 2t ) = −
[
f1t − f2t + Z1t · b1t − Z2t · b2t
]
dt+ (Z1t − Z2t )dWt
= − [f1t − f2t + Z2t · (b1t − b2t )] dt+ (Z1t − Z2t )dWµ1,α1t
= − [f1t − f2t + Z1t · (b1t − b2t )] dt+ (Z1t − Z2t )dWµ2,α2t ,
with Y 1T −Y 2T = g(X,µ1)−g(X,µ2). Recall that Pµ,α agrees with P on F0 for each
µ ∈ Pψ(C) and α ∈ A. In particular,
E
µ1,α1
[
Y 10 − Y 20
]
= E
[
Y 10 − Y 20
]
= Eµ
2,α2
[
Y 10 − Y 20
]
.
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Thus, if ∆g(X) := g(X,µ1)− g(X,µ2), then
E
[
Y 10 − Y 20
]
= Eµ
1,α1
[
∆g(X) +
∫ T
0
(
f1t − f2t + Z2t ·
(
b1t − b2t
))
dt
]
(7.9)
= Eµ
2,α2
[
∆g(X) +
∫ T
0
(
f1t − f2t + Z1t ·
(
b1t − b2t
))
dt
]
. (7.10)
Since the optimal control maximizes the Hamiltonian,
f1t + Z
2
t · b1t = h(t,X, µ1, ν1t , Z2t , α1t ) ≤ H(t,X, µ1, ν1t , Z2t )
= f1(t,X, µ
1) + f2(t, µ
1, ν1t ) + f3(t,X, α
2
t ) + Z
2
t · b2t .
Thus, since
f2t = f1(t,X, µ
2) + f2(t, µ
2, ν2t ) + f3(t,X, α
2
t ),
defining ∆f1(t,X) := f1(t,X, µ
1)− f1(t,X, µ2) yields
f1t − f2t + Z2t ·
(
b1t − b2t
) ≤ ∆f1(t,X) + f2(t, µ1, ν1t )− f2(t, µ2, ν2t ). (7.11)
By switching the place of the indices, the same argument yields
f1t − f2t + Z1t ·
(
b1t − b2t
) ≥ ∆f1(t,X) + f2(t, µ1, ν1t )− f2(t, µ2, ν2t ). (7.12)
Since f2(t, µ
i, νit) are deterministic, applying inequality (7.11) to (7.9) and (7.12)
to (7.10) yields
0 ≤
[
E
µ1,α1 − Eµ2,α2
] [
∆g(X) +
∫ T
0
∆f1(t,X)dt
]
.
Hypothesis (U.4) implies that the right side is at most zero, so in fact
0 =
[
E
µ1,α1 − Eµ2,α2
] [
∆g(X) +
∫ T
0
∆f1(t,X)dt
]
. (7.13)
Suppose α1 6= α2 holds on a (t, ω)-set of strictly positive L × P -measure, where
L is again Lebesgue measure. Then assumption (U.1) implies that the inequalities
(7.11) and (7.12) are strict on a set of positive L×P -measure. Since P ∼ Pµ1,α1 ∼
Pµ
2,α2 , this implies
0 <
[
E
µ1,α1 − Eµ2,α2
] [
∆g(X) +
∫ T
0
∆f1(t,X)dt
]
,
which contradicts (7.13). Thus α1 6= α2 must hold L × P -a.e., which yields
dPµ
1,α1
dP
= E
(∫ ·
0
σ−1b(t,X, α1t )dWt
)
T
= E
(∫ ·
0
σ−1b(t,X, α2t )dWt
)
T
=
dPµ
2,α2
dP
, a.s.
Thus µ1 = Pµ
1,α1 ◦ X−1 = Pµ2,α2 ◦ X−1 = µ2, and ν1t = δPµ1,α1◦(α1t )−1 =
δPµ2,α2◦(α2t )−1
= ν2t a.e. 
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8. Proof of finite-player approximation theorems
This section justifies the mean field approximation by proving Theorem 4.2, the
general approximation result, as well as Proposition 6.1, the rate of convergence for
the price impact model.
8.1. Proof of Theorem 4.2. We work on the probability space of Section 4.
Recall that under P , X1, X2, . . . are i.i.d. with common law µˆ and α1t , α
2
t , . . . are
i.i.d. with common law qˆt, for almost every t. By symmetry, we may prove the
result for player 1 only. For β ∈ An, define βα := (β, α2, . . . , αn) ∈ Ann. We abuse
notation somewhat by writing α in place of (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Ann. Note that (α1)α = α
and Pn(α) = P , in our notation. For β ∈ An, let
J ′n(β) := E
Pn(β
α)
[∫ T
0
f(t,X1, µˆ, qˆt, βt)dt+ g(X
1, µˆ)
]
.
Note that J ′n(α
1) does not depend on n. We divide the proof into three lemmas.
Lemma 8.1. Let F : C×Pψ(C)→ R be empirically measurable, and suppose F (x, ·)
is τψ(C) continuous at µˆ for each x ∈ C. Assume also that there exists c > 0 such
that
|F (x, µ)| ≤ c
(
ψ(x) +
∫
ψ dµ
)
, for all (x, µ) ∈ C × Pψ(C).
Then limn→∞ E[|F (X i, µn)− F (X i, µˆ)|p] = 0 for each i and p ∈ [1, 2).
Proof. By symmetry, it suffices to prove this for i = 1. By replacing F (x, µ) with
|F (x, µ) − F (x, µˆ)|, assume without loss of generality that F ≥ 0 and F (x, µˆ) = 0
for all x. Define
νn :=
1
n− 1
n∑
i=2
δXi .
By independence of X1 and νn, we have
E[F (X1, µn)] = E
[
E
[
F
(
x,
1
n
δx +
n− 1
n
νn
)]
x=X1
]
.
Now let ǫ > 0. By continuity of F (x, ·), there exist δ > 0 and φ1, . . . , φk ∈ Bψ(C)
such that F (x, ν) < ǫ whenever | ∫ φid(ν − µˆ)| < δ for all i = 1, . . . , k. By the law
of large numbers,
lim
n→∞
∣∣∣∣∫ φi d( 1nδx + n− 1n νn − µˆ
)∣∣∣∣ = 0, a.s.
Thus
lim sup
n→∞
F
(
x,
1
n
δx +
n− 1
n
νn
)
≤ ǫ, a.s.,
for each ǫ > 0, and so F
(
x, 1nδx +
n−1
n ν
n
) → 0 a.s. for each x. The growth
assumption along with (S.2) yield
E
[
F 2(X1, µn)
] ≤ 2c2E[ψ2(X1) + (∫ ψ dµn)2] ≤ 4c2E [ψ2(X1)] <∞,
and we conclude by the dominated convergence theorem. 
Lemma 8.2. We have limn→∞ supβ∈An |Jn,1(βα)− J ′n(β)| = 0.
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Proof. Note that, for any β ∈ An,
|Jn,1(βα)− J ′n(β)| ≤
∫ T
0
E
Pn(β
α)[Ft(X
1, µn) +Gt(X
1, qn(βαt ))]dt
+ EPn(β
α)[|g(X1, µn)− g(X1, µˆ)|], (8.1)
where F : [0, T ]× C × Pψ(C)→ R and G : [0, T ]× C × P(A)→ R are defined by
Ft(x, µ) := sup
(a,q)∈A×P(A)
|f(t, x, µ, q, a)− f(t, x, µˆ, q, a)|,
Gt(x, q) := sup
a∈A
|f(t, x, µˆ, q, a)− f(t, x, µˆ, qˆt, a)|.
Theorem 18.19 of [2] ensures that both functions are (empirically) measurable.
Since A and P(A) are compact, Lemma 5.6 assures us that Ft(x, ·) is τψ(C)-
continuous at µˆ and that Gt(x, ·) is weakly continuous, for each (t, x). Similar
to the proof of Lemma 7.7, {dPn(βα)/dP : β ∈ An, n ≥ 1} are bounded in Lp(P ),
for any p ≥ 1. Since assumption (F.5) is uniform in t for f , we deduce from Lemma
8.1 and the dominated convergence theorem that
lim
n→∞
sup
β∈An
[∫ T
0
E
Pn(β
α)[Ft(X
1, µn)]dt+ EPn(β
α)[|g(X1, µn)− g(X1, µˆ)|]
]
= 0.
It remains to check that the Gt term converges. Note that Gt(x, ·) is uniformly
continuous, as P(A) is compact. Also V1(qn(βαt ), qn(αt)) ≤ 2/n, since these are
empirical measures of n points which differ in only one point (recall that V1 denotes
total variation). Hence
lim
n→∞
sup
β∈An
∣∣Gt(X1, qn(αt))−Gt(X1, qn(βαt ))∣∣ = 0, a.s.
Since α1t , α
2
t , . . . are i.i.d. with common law qˆt, we have q
n(αt) → qˆt weakly a.s.
(see [39]), and thus Gt(X
1, qn(αt)) → 0 a.s. Note that dPn(βα)/dP are bounded
in Lp(P ) for any p ≥ 1 and that the integrands above are bounded in Lp(P ) for
any p ∈ [1, 2), by (F.5) and the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 8.2. The
dominated convergence theorem completes the proof. 
Lemma 8.3. For any β ∈ An, J ′n(α1) ≥ J ′n(β).
Proof. We use the comparison principle for BSDEs. Fix n and β ∈ An. Define
φ, φ˜ : [0, T ]× Ω× Rd → R by
φ(t, z) := sup
a∈A
[
f(t,X1, µˆ, qˆt, a) + z ·
(
σ−1b(t,X1, a)− σ−1b(t,X1, α1t )
)]
φ˜(t, z) := f(t,X1, µˆ, qˆt, βt) + z ·
(
σ−1b(t,X1, βt)− σ−1b(t,X1, α1t )
)
By Pardoux and Peng [36], there exist unique solutions (Y, Z1, . . . , Zn) and (Y˜ , Z˜1, . . . , Z˜n)
of the BSDEs {
dYt = −φn(t, Z1t )dt+
∑n
j=1 Z
j
t dW
j
t
YT = g(X
1, µˆ),{
dY˜t = −φ˜n(t, Z˜1t )dt+
∑n
j=1 Z˜
j
t dW
j
t
Y˜T = g(X
1, µˆ).
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The unique solution of the first BSDE is in fact given by Z2 ≡ . . . ≡ Zn ≡ 0, where
(Y, Z1) are X1-progressively measurable and solve the BSDE{
dYt = −
[
H(t,X1, µˆ, qˆt, Z
1
t )− Z1t · σ−1b(t,X1, α1t )
]
dt+ Z1t dW
1
t
YT = g(X
1, µˆ).
This is due to the X1-measurability of the driver and terminal condition of this
BSDE. Recall that α1 is optimal for the mean field problem, and thus it must
maximize the Hamiltonian; that is,
H(t,X1, µˆ, qˆt, Z
1
t ) = h(t,X
1, µˆ, qˆt, Z
1
t , α
1
t )
= f(t,X1, µˆ, qˆt, α
1
t ) + Z
1
t · σ−1b(t,X1, α1t ).
Thus dYt = −f(t,X1, µˆ, qˆt, α1t )dt + Z1t dW 1t . Since W 1 is a Wiener process under
P , taking expectations yields E[Y0] = J
′
n(α
1), which we note does not depend on
n.
Similarly, note that W j , j ≥ 2 are Wiener processes under Pn(βα), as is W β,1.
Hence, we rewrite Y˜ as follows:{
dY˜t = −f(t,X1, µˆ, qˆt, βt)dt+ Z˜1t dW β,1t +
∑n
j=2 Z˜
j
t dW
j
t
Y˜T = g(X
1, µˆ).
Take expectations, noting that P = Pn(β
α) on Fn0 , to see E[Y˜0] = EPn(β
α)[Y˜0] =
J ′n(β). Finally, since φ ≥ φ˜, the comparison principle for BSDEs yields Y0 ≥ Y˜0,
and thus J ′n(β) ≤ J ′n(α1). 
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Simply let ǫn = 2 supβ∈An |Jn,1(βα)− J ′n(β)|. Then ǫn → 0
by Lemma 8.2, and Lemma 8.3 yields, for all β ∈ An,
Jn,1(β
α) ≤ 1
2
ǫn + J
′
n(β) ≤
1
2
ǫn + J
′
n(α
1) ≤ ǫn + Jn,1(α).

8.2. Proof of Proposition 6.1.
Proof of Proposition 6.1. We simply modify the proof of Theorem 4.2, in light of the
special structure of the price impact model. Namely, the inequality (8.1) becomes
ǫn = 2 sup
β∈An
|Jn,1(βα)− J ′n(β)|
≤ 2 sup
β∈An
E
Pn(β)
∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣γX1t ∫
A
c′d(qnt (β
α)− qˆt)
∣∣∣∣ dt.
Use Ho¨lder’s inequality to get
ǫn ≤ 2γE
[‖X1‖4]1/4 sup
β∈An
E
[(
dPn(β)
dP
)4]1/4 ∫ T
0
Ft(β)
1/2dt,
where
Ft(β) := E
[(∫
A
c′d(qnt (β
α)− qˆt)
)2]
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Assumption (S.2) with ψ(x) = ec1‖x‖ implies that ‖X1‖ has finite moments of all
orders. Again, {dPn(βα)/dP : β ∈ An, n ≥ 1} are bounded in Lp(P ) for any p ≥ 1.
So it suffices to show
sup
β∈An
Ft(β) ≤ C/n,
for some C > 0. This will follow from two inequalities: An easy calculation gives∣∣∣∣∫
A
c′d(qnt (β
α)− qˆt)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2C1/n+ ∣∣∣∣∫
A
c′d(qnt (α)− qˆt)
∣∣∣∣ ,
where C1 = supa∈A |c′(a)|. Since α1t , α2t , . . . are i.i.d. with common law qˆt,
E
[(∫
A
c′d(qnt (α) − qˆt)
)2]
= Var(c′(α1t ))/n ≤ 4C21/n.

9. Conclusions
This paper provides a theoretical framework for fairly general mean field games
with uncontrolled volatility, allowing us to prove new existence and uniqueness
results for several types of mean field interactions which arise naturally in applica-
tions, and which were not studied before. Such results include models with rank
effects, nearest-neighbor (e.g. quantile) interactions, and mean field interactions
through the controls. The strength of our approach is its generality; the existence,
uniqueness, and approximation results apply easily to many concrete models. More
refined analysis, for example of regularity of solutions or numerics, could in theory
be based on the McKean-Vlasov FBSDE discussed in Remark 7.12, which essen-
tially provides a probabilistic representation of the PDE approach of [32]. This is
left for further investigation.
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